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ABSTRACT 
Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace departed ways on the implications of evolution for 
human cognition. While Darwin argued that natural selection affected both the reliability 
and unreliability of human cognitive faculties, Wallace rejected the idea that natural 
selection could explain higher order intelligence. If Wallace is right, then Darwinian 
epistemology seems implausible. However, I argue that this position is false. In Chapter 1 
I survey a history of Darwinian epistemology. In Chapter 2 I examine the Scope 
Objection to Darwinian epistemology: that evolution did not supply us with the natural 
cognitive capacities for achieving non-adaptive true beliefs. In Chapter 3 I respond to the 
Scope Objection by assessing Robert McCauley’s theory of natural cognition. In Chapter 
4 I evaluate two difficulties with my response to the Scope Objection. I conclude that 
evolution is sufficient for explaining the reliability of human cognitive faculties in non-
adaptive domains of belief.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. THE GENERAL PROBLEM: EVOLUTION AND RELIABLE COGNITION 
 
 Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is one of the great 
achievements of western science.
1
 Indeed, E.O. Wilson ranks On the Origin of Species as 
one of the most important books ever written.
2
 Wilson’s high regard for The Origin is 
appropriate not only for understanding biological change, but also for considering human 
nature.
3
 Darwin states in The Origin that evolution impacts future domains of inquiry and 
that psychology will be based on new foundations.
4
 In a similar way, Ernst Mayr thinks 
that “evolution has an impact on every aspect of man’s thinking: his philosophy, his 
metaphysics, his ethics…”5 More recently Daniel Dennett proclaims that evolution 
“…eats through just about every traditional concept, and leaves in its wake a 
revolutionized world-view, with most of the old landmarks still recognizable, but 
transformed in fundamental ways.”6 Thus, according to many biologists and 
philosophers, we have reason to think that Darwin’s theory will yield new understanding 
about human nature in general and human psychology in particular.   
                                                          
1
 Michael Ruse and Joseph Travis, Evolution: The First Four Billion Years (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2009), ix. 
 
2
 E.O Wilson, “Forward,” in Evolution: The First Four Billion Years (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
2009), vii.   
 
3
 See E.O Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1975).  
 
4
 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: Or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, Albemarle, 1859), 449. Helen De Cruz argues that this reference 
to Darwin exaggerates a foreshadowing of a whole new program of Darwinian epistemology.  Perhaps this 
is true, but neither was Darwin fully aware of the implications of his theory for epistemology.    
 
5
 Ernst Mayr, “Interview,” Omni, March/April 1988, 46.  
 
6
 Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: 
Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1995), 63. 
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 Evolution is a process of change over time within a population of organisms and 
includes three related ideas.
 7
 First, evolution refers to descent with modification: all 
living things are all related and the diversity and relationship of species to one another is 
the product of a long history of change through genetic inheritance.
8
 Second, evolution 
describes when and where species split from various lineages and the changes that took 
place.
9
 Third, evolution refers to the mechanisms driving biological change, including 
natural selection, sexual selection, and genetic drift.
10
  
Questions arise about the impact of evolution on our cognitive capacities. Karl 
Popper understood human knowledge and our abilities for rationality a product of natural 
selection: “The specifically human ability to know, and the ability to produce scientific 
knowledge, are the results of natural selection.”11 But not everyone shares an optimistic 
view that evolution delivered reliable cognition. Friedrich Nietzsche argued that our 
cognitive faculties are unreliable given their evolutionary origin. For Nietzsche the result 
is a universal scepticism about the human capacity to form true belief. If the evolutionary 
process for generating knowledge and rational belief is unreliable, whence the 
evolutionary support for our beliefs? Can we be optimistic about the truth of our 
                                                          
7
 Ernst Mayr, What Evolution Is (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 8; Carl Zimmer and Douglas J. 
Emlen, Evolution: Making Sense of Life (Colorado: Roberts and Company Publishers, 2013), 3-5.   
 
8
 Ruse and Travis, Evolution, ix; Ernst Mayr, What Evolution, 7; Francisco Ayala, “The Evolution 
of Life,” in Evolutionary and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds., Robert 
John Russell, William R. Stoeger, S.J. and Fancisco J. Ayala (Berkeley: Center for Theology and the 
Natural Sciences and Vatican Observatory Publications, 1998), 27. 
 
9
 Ruse and Travis, Evolution, ix; Ayala, “The Evolution,” 27. 
 
10
 Ruse and Travis, Evolution, ix; Ayala, “The Evolution,” 27; Stephen Jay Gould, “The Evolution 
of Life,” Scientific America, (October 1994): 92.  See also Mayr, What, 115.  Natural selection is only one 
mechanism driving change.  Other mechanisms include sexual selection and genetic drift; see Zimmer and 
Emlen, Evolution, 46-7. 
 
11
 Karl Popper, “Evolutionary Epistemology,” in Evolutionary Theory: Paths into the Future, ed. 
J. W. Pollard (London: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1984), 239. 
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philosophical and scientific beliefs when the causal process responsible for these beliefs 
is unreliable? Nietzsche doesn’t think so. Instead, he argues that human beliefs are the 
product of selected faculties shaped for survival regardless of truth.
12
  
Nietzsche is not alone in this skeptical pronouncement. Several contemporary 
philosophers reject the claim that evolution was able to generate reliable cognitive 
faculties, either with respect to cognition generally or within specific cognitive 
domains.
13
 While some philosophers and biologists argue that evolution generated 
reliable cognitive faculties, others argue that evolution precludes cognitive reliability. 
These opposing views underscore the division between evolutionary supporting 
arguments (ESAs) and evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs).
14
   
ESAs typically argue that if our ancestral environment included disease, nutrition 
and predation, then there would have been pressure for organisms to form true beliefs 
about the environment. Individuals within a population that reliably form true beliefs will 
likely survive and reproduce, passing their fitness enhancing genes on to future 
generations.  This evolutionary process need not be perfect or optimal insofar as ESAs 
are concerned as long as sub-optimality does not interfere with the selection of fitness 
                                                          
12
 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Notebook 36, 1885,” in Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. 
Rudiger Bittner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26; Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 110. 
 
13
 See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), and 
more recently Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why The Materialist New Darwinian Conception of 
Nature is almost certainly false (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Stephen Stich, The 
Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation (MIT Press, 1990).   
 
 
14
 I have altered the terminology slightly. ESAs typically go by the term evolutionary arguments 
(EAs). But this is confusing because evolutionary arguments could (in principle) take the form of a 
debunking strategy.  For a summary, see Helen De Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan De Smedt, and Stefan 
Blancke, “Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification.” dialectica Vol. 65, no. 4 (2011): 517–535.  
ESA’s and EDA’s are also synonymous  with the terms “evolutionary supporting strategies” and 
“evolutionary debunking strategies.” 
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enhancing and reliable cognitive faculties. Consequently, the most promising 
evolutionary supporting strategies defend the reliability of common-sense faculties 
because such mechanisms are the most likely to have been selected for by evolution.
 15
       
EDAs attack ESAs in two ways.
16
 The first way distinguishes between adaptive 
value and true belief. Proponents of this way argue that faculties that typically generate 
fitness enhancing false beliefs are just as likely to have been selected for as faculties that 
reliably produce true belief. So, according to the first type of EDA the probability that 
our cognitive faculties are reliable given evolution by natural selection remains 
inscrutable. The second way of attack is more limited in scope. According to this second 
type of EDA, although evolution may have selected for some reliable faculties, faculties 
divorced from adaptive value remain invisible to selection.
17
 Therefore, faculties 
producing non-adaptive beliefs in the domain of science and philosophy should be treated 
with suspicion if the mechanisms responsible for these beliefs were to have evolved.
18
 
EDAs also target moral and religious beliefs. Richard Joyce argues that the 
evolution of the belief in objective moral facts diminishes the justification for the belief 
                                                          
15
 See Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins (in press), “When do evolutionary explanations of belief 
debunk belief?” in Darwin in the 21st Century: Nature, Humanity, and God, ed.  P.R Sloan (Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame University Press, forthcoming), 5-7; De Cruz et al., “Evolutionary Approaches,” 520. 
  
16
 For a brief introduction, see Guy Kahane, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments,” Nous, vol 45, 
no. 1 (2011): 103–125.  I depart from Kahane’s schema because at this point our question is about 
cognitive reliability and not necessarily epistemic justification.     
 
17
 I depart from the traditional understanding of evolutionary debunking strategies that suggest 
natural selection is of limited importance in shaping cognition, while other evolutionary processes are more 
liable to have produced unreliable faculties. First, it seems to me that natural selection is of optimal 
importance in shaping reliable cognition. Second, it also seems that sexual selection plays an important role 
in shaping cognition; indeed, recent studies affirm cognitive delay in the absence of sexual selection. See 
Brian Holis and Tadeusz J. Kawecki, “Male Cognitive Performance Declines in the Absence of Sexual 
Selection,” The Royal Society, vol. 281, no. 1781 (2014). The point I wish to draw is that EDAs of the 
second sort are domain specific, unlike the former, universal debunking strategies. 
    
18
 De Cruz et al., “Evolutionary Approaches,” 525.  
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in objective morality. The reason for this is two-fold. First, objective moral facts are not 
natural facts.
19
 That is, objective moral facts do not contribute to natural selection 
because they do not fall within the purview of natural facts. Second, our belief in 
objective moral facts would obtain by natural means even if such facts failed to exist. In 
other words, our moral awareness does not track the truth of moral facts. This implies 
that human’s objective moral intuition is counter-factually insensitive and is therefore 
unjustified.
20
   
Religious facts follow a similar pattern of being counter-factually insensitive.  
Pascal Boyer argues that the human mind was hard-wired for religion by evolution for 
holding minimally counter-intuitive beliefs in the existence of supernatural beings.
21
 The 
essential point is that religious concepts are advantageous enough for acquiring cultural 
transmission, but not overly counter-intuitive to lose appeal. Therefore, humans would 
hold religious beliefs regardless of whether or not supernatural beings existed. This 
implies that religious beliefs do not track the truth of religious facts and so religious 
belief is unjustified. 22  
                                                          
19
 Although Joyce presses this point, others reject that moral facts are not natural facts; see 
especially Scott James, An Introduction to Evolutionary Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011).  I’m thankful to 
Helen De Cruz for raising this point. 
 
20
 See Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).   
Joyce seems to nuance his understanding of moral ontology, in apart from Michael Ruse and E.O Wilson, 
“Moral Philosophy as Applied Science,” Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 236 (Apr., 1986), 173-192.  See also S. 
Street, 2006, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Philosophical Studies 127: 109-66. 
 
21
 Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New 
York/London: Basic Books/Heinemann, 2001).   
 
22
 See also Paul Bloom “Religious Belief as an Evolutionary Accident,” in The Believing Primate: 
Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origins of Religion, eds. Michael Murray and 
Jeffrey Schloss (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 119.  For response, see Michael Murray, 
“Scientific Explanations of Religion and the Justification of Religious Belief,” in The Believing Primate: 
Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origins of Religion, eds. Michael Murray and 
Jeffrey Schloss (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 168, 173. Also see Kelly James Clark and Justin 
Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” Academy of Religion 79 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM       
If our non-adaptive beliefs, including our systematic theories about knowledge 
and rational belief, are beyond the scope of our evolved cognition, then epistemology 
should be treated with suspicion. Darwinian epistemology (hereafter, DE) argues that 
evolutionary processes are sufficient for explaining the reliability of our cognitive 
facilities.
23
 But debunking strategies undermine DE, since non-adaptive belief is beyond 
the scope of evolved, cognitive faculties. Consider the following Scope Objection to DE. 
A. The Scope Objection 
1. DE is plausible only if evolution supplied us with the natural cognitive capacities 
for achieving non-adaptive true beliefs. 
2. Evolution did not supply us with the natural cognitive capacities for achieving 
non-adaptive true beliefs. 
3. So, DE is implausible. 
In this thesis I argue that the Scope Objection to DE fails. More specifically, I argue that 
premise two of the Scope Objection is false. I employ Robert McCauley’s distinction 
between maturationally natural cognition and practiced natural cognition and note how 
the application and evolution of practiced naturalness supports DE. Moreover, I consider 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(2011): 639-675. It is important to note that debunking arguments also apply to truth and falsity, not only 
justification.  Joyce has recently abandoned his earlier view relating debunking with justification.  For this 
discussion, see Richard Joyce, “Evolution, Truth-Tracking, and Moral Skepticism,” (forthcoming), 
accessed March 1, 2014, 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/staff/richard_joyce/acrobat/joyce_evolution.truthtracking.moral.skepticism.pdf; 
and Ben Foster, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Reliability of Moral Cognition,” 
(forthcoming), accessed March 1, 2014, 
https://www.academia.edu/3350289/Evolutionary_Debunking_Arguments_and_the_Reliability_of_Moral_
Cognition#.   
 
23
 This does not include all our cognitive mechanisms. Evolutionary processes would likely have 
supplied faculties that are also unreliable. We explore this position in chapter 2 and 3. 
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two criteria necessary for the rise of science as an example of practiced naturalness and 
note how evolution supplied faculties as such. If this is right, then it seems plausible that 
evolution supplied practiced natural faculties for non-adaptive beliefs more generally, 
including our theories of knowledge and rational belief.       
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM FOR EPISTEMOLOGY 
As I have noted above, according to some epistemologists the evolution of human 
cognition leads to a universal skepticism about its capacity to form true belief. But true 
belief addresses only one aspect of epistemology, because epistemology also considers 
the question of epistemic justification. Justification refers to the degree of support 
obtained for true and false beliefs. Therefore, assessing the implications of evolution for 
epistemology must also consider the impact on epistemic justification.     
A primary significance for this research concerns its contributions to dealing with 
scepticism. According to evolutionary debunking strategies, evolutionary theory 
functions like a present-day Cartesian Demon, by undermining the justification for true 
and false beliefs.
24
 Evolutionary supporting strategies draw the opposite conclusion, such 
that evolution replaces the need for postulating Descartes’ God for justifying true belief.25 
Still, it remains unclear exactly how evolution and epistemic justification coincide, 
especially with respect to the justification of non-adaptive belief. Although I explore the 
importance of evolutionary justification in the conclusion, I generally ignore the issue.  
That is because the literature relevant to DE remains unclear about the relationship 
between evolution and justification. In some cases, philosophers and biologists use 
                                                          
24
 De Cruz, “Evolutionary Approaches,” 522. 
 
25
 Sober, “The Evolution,” 110. 
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epistemic concepts differently when discussing the connection between evolution and 
justification, while at other times epistemic concepts are ignored altogether.
26
 Certainly, 
DE must include viable theories of justification, but only after it defends a plausible view 
of truth-conducive reliability.  
IV. PLAN OF RESEARCH 
A. Inquired Study and Philosophical Reflection  
The primary focus of this project defends DE from critics who claim that 
evolution cannot account for reliable cognitive faculties in non-adaptive domains of 
belief. I argue that ESAs succeed in this way. In defense this claim, I intend to evaluate 
Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary debunking strategy and Paul Griffiths’ and John Wilkins’ 
evolutionary supporting strategy. Although both arguments arrive at different 
conclusions, they accept the evolution of reliable common-sense faculties, thereby 
providing the right context for stating the Scope Objection. I then argue that the Scope 
Objection is false by defending two contentions. First, I reject premise two by nuancing 
the term “natural” in order to distinguish between two types of natural cognition, one of 
which overcomes evolved limitations and produces non-adaptive beliefs. Second, I 
provide an example of the evolution of practiced natural faculties responsible for the rise 
of science, and note how evolutionary processes are sufficient to explain the reliability of 
such faculties.
27
   
 
                                                          
26
 Michael Ruse ignores the topic of justification and focuses only on truth. Richard Joyce, Paul 
Griffiths, and John Wilkins focus on justification by way of truth-tracking, but define truth-tracking 
differently than traditional concepts of truth-tracking. This isn’t a problem only that it creates some 
confusion about how evolution relates with justification.    
 
27
 Robert McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 107-8, 138. 
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B. Definitions 
Darwinian Epistemology: The claim that evolution supplied reliable cognitive faculties 
for generating true belief. This is a restricted definition of DE that precludes justification.  
Moreover, in this case DE includes other evolutionary mechanisms besides natural 
selection for the development of human cognitive faculties. Perhaps other evolutionary 
forces (e.g. sexual selection, by-products, biological emergence, and genetic drift) 
contributed to human cognitive development. Thus, I refrain from using the term 
“selected for” as much as possible as to not restrict the wide range of evolutionary 
processes that may have contributed to the reliability of human cognition. Finally, I’ve 
chosen the term Darwinian epistemology and not Evolutionary Epistemology, so as to 
avoid a wide range of distinctions in Evolutionary epistemology and Naturalized 
epistemology more broadly.  
 
Evolutionary Justification: The view that S’s belief that p is justified in degree x if and 
only if: S believes p, p is true, and p tracks truth. Conversely, negative accounts of 
evolutionary justification reject condition three, arguing that human cognitive faculties 
are not truth-tracking.  
Truth-tracking (traditional notion): A faculty F is truth-tracking if and only if F does not 
produce counter-factually insensitive beliefs. S’s belief that p is counterfactually 
insensitive if and only if S would believe P even if P were false.
28
  
 
Cognition. Cognition is the broad understanding of how human minds/brains represent 
and process information, perception, thought, and action. Natural cognition concerns the 
invisible and non-reflective part of human’s mental lives that operate fast, intuitively, and 
without effort; in contrast to unnatural cognition that requires reflection, time, and 
effort.
29
   
 
Maturational Natural Cognition. Maturational Natural cognition represents the 
immediate, intuitive beliefs and actions in cognitive domains without awareness.  
Speaking a native language, chewing, belief in naïve physics are all representative of 
maturational skills.
30
 At times, I use the term maturational to coincide with common 
sense and it never implies the act of “maturing.” 
                                                          
28 This definition is different than the one given by Griffiths and Wilkins: “Organisms track truth 
optimally if they obtain as much relevant truth as they can afford, and tolerate no more error than is needed 
to obtain it.” This definition resembles Richard Joyce’s. I’m unclear how GW relate truth-tracking with 
justification but this is irrelevant for establishing the Scope Objection.   
 
29
 See McCauley, Why Religion, 4.This includes pre-reflective cognitive modules generating 
beliefs about physical objects, (e.g. my naïve physics: beliefs that solid objects fall and do not pass through 
solid objects; naïve biology: beliefs that species give birth to their own kind; and theory of mind: 
knowledge about other agents, their intentions and desires by using cognitive tools for mind reading. It is 
generally accepted that this cognitive capability would have incurred selective advantage.  McCauley, 
Why, 76-82; “Theory of Mind,” accessed December 14 2013, http://www.iep.utm.edu/theomind/. 
30
 McCauley, Why Religion, 5 
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Practiced Natural Cognition. Practiced Natural cognition represents skills that require 
tools and specialized training in some specific cognitive domain.  For example, 
specializing in engineering requires applying practiced natural cognition, unlike 
maturational natural cognition.
31
     
Non-Adaptive Belief. Beliefs that would have been unnecessary for fitness and survival, 
including philosophical and scientific beliefs. 
 
Adaptive Belief. These are beliefs that would have been necessary for our ancestors’ 
survival.  For example, perceptual beliefs are often cited as holding adaptive value.   
C. Chapter Summary 
Chapter 1 surveys a brief history of DE, from Charles Darwin and Alfred 
Wallace, to contemporary accounts like Michael Ruse and Thomas Nagel. The purpose of 
this chapter provides a context for understanding the relationship between evolution and 
epistemology. In Chapter 2 I examine Plantinga’s EDA and Griffiths’ and Wilkins’ 
common-sense ESA in order to state and examine the Scope Objection at the end of the 
chapter. In Chapter 3 I respond to the Scope Objection by introducing Robert 
McCauley’s theory of natural cognition and his criteria for the rise of science. I focus 
specifically on McCauley’s distinction between maturational naturalness and practiced 
naturalness, and his criteria for the rise of science. In Chapter 4 I assess two objections to 
my response to the Scope Objection. First, Plantinga’s debunking strategy undermines 
my solution because he distinguishes between cognitive indication and belief content. 
Second, Richard Lewontin remains skeptical that theories of cognitive evolution are 
tenable.
32
 If Lewontin is right, then premise two of the Scope Objection remains 
inscrutable. I consider both objections and note how they fail to undermine my response 
to the Scope Objection.   
                                                          
31
 McCauley, Why Religion, 5, 20-30 
 
32
 Richard Lewontin, “The Evolution of Cognition: Questions We Will Never Answer,” in An 
invitation to cognitive science, Volume 4: Methods, models, and conceptual issues, ed. Scarborough and S. 
Sternberg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1998). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Those who support evolutionary debunking strategies do so by defining natural 
cognition by way of maturational naturalness, and then argue that such common-sense 
capacities are incapable of achieving non-adaptive beliefs. This position is true but also 
neglects the wider complexity of human cognition. A more nuanced assessment of human 
cognition includes practiced natural faculties, such that humans possess cognitive 
capabilities for overcoming maturational biases and with the potential to form non-
adaptive beliefs. If this is right, then proponents of evolutionary supporting strategies 
enjoy a wide range of theses describing how evolution supplied faculties necessary for 
achieving non-adaptive beliefs, including systematic theories of epistemology.       
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Chapter One 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF DARWINIAN EPISTEMOLOGY 
In this chapter I map a brief history of DE in order to set the context for my 
analysis of Chapter 2 and the Scope Objection. A history of DE begins with Charles 
Darwin, who briefly examined the impact of evolution on human cognitive faculties. 
Darwin’s contemporary Alfred Russell Wallace drew a different conclusion and was 
sceptical about evolution’s capacity for explaining the non-adaptive features of human 
natural cognition.   
I. EVOLUTIONARY SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS: MAPPING THE 
LANDSCAPE 
Darwin affirms that human cognitive abilities reflect their evolutionary origin. 
But only in the mid twentieth-century is there substantial application of Darwin’s theory 
for epistemology. Konrad Lorenz applies evolution by natural selection with Immanual 
Kant’s synthetic a priori, suggesting that Darwin’s theory of evolution superseded Kant’s 
theory of knowledge. More recently philosophers of biology express new ways of 
relating Darwin’s theory with epistemology. These theories include assessing non-
adaptationist paradigms of evolution, while noting the consequences for theories of truth.  
In order to appreciate these historical developments, one must begin with Darwin. 
A. Darwin’s Origin of Species 
Darwin affirms that the mind is part of the material world and thus prone to 
selection.
33
 The central idea is that belief formation reflects the biological heritage to the 
                                                          
33
 By selection I mean “natural selection.”  I do not consider whether Darwin attributed the 
evolution of the mind to sexual selection as well; see Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in 
Relation to Sex, second edition (New York: A.L. Burt Company, 1874), 695.  See also Geoffrey Miller, The 
Mating Mind:  How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature (London: William Heineman, 
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extent that evolution selected cognition necessary for survival.
34
 Hence, the mind is not, 
following the empiricist John Locke, a blank sheet open to experience, but rather arrives 
“pre-assembled” with the cognitive hardware necessary for survival.35 Our “would be” 
ancestors who failed to apply beliefs necessary for survival would not have reproduced, 
whereas heritable, fitness-enhancing cognition would be passed to future generations. As 
a result, Darwin states: “Origin of man now proved – metaphysic must flourish – he who 
understands baboon would do more towards metaphysics than Locke.”36 Although 
traditionally within the purview of philosophical reflection, Darwin thinks that belief 
formation can be understood empirically by describing the cognitive constraints selected 
by evolution.
37
  
According to Darwin, one implication of evolution for epistemology is the 
employment of evolutionary concepts prior to any philosophical endeavour:  
To study Metaphysic[s], as they have always been studied appears to me to be 
puzzling Astronomy without Mechanics. Experience shows the problem of the 
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mind cannot be solved by attacking the citadel itself. The mind is a function of the 
body. We must bring some stable foundation to argue from.
38
 
 
In other words, Darwin’s theory informs other domains of inquiry, including the social 
sciences and philosophy.
39
 While Darwin was not a philosopher, he lays the foundation 
for supporting DE, a project further undertaken by Konrad Lorenz through his 
interpretation of and response to Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.40   
B. Lorenz’s A Priori 
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant revolutionizes the empiricist and 
rationalist conceptions of knowledge. Empiricists thought knowledge obtained through 
the senses, while rationalists thought knowledge was based on the innate principles of 
pure reason.
41
 Kant synthesized both views of knowledge by postulating that human 
understanding of experience requires identifying its metaphysical categories.
42
 In other 
words, knowledge bears the mark of both experience and reason together.
43
   
Kant’s theory of knowledge has two implications for DE. First, the a priori 
categories necessary for understanding experience are metaphysical. Kant argues that a 
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priori categories govern experience by providing the basic structure for interpreting 
experience. For example, one must already assume that every event has a cause in order 
to understand the experience of causation. Making sense of one’s experience of causation 
requires presupposing the basic metaphysical categories of causation.
44
  
The second implication of Kant’s theory of knowledge for DE is that we cannot 
know the world “as it is in itself” since we cannot have knowledge beyond experience. 
Part of the Critique challenges the rationalist assumption that pure reason provides 
knowledge without appealing to experience.
45
But this is absurd, according to Kant. Pure 
reason presupposes the point of view of the knower in that awareness of the a priori 
obtains from experiences of the world. Thus, for Kant objective knowledge can be found 
only within the confines of appearance, whereby the form of appearances requires the 
employment of a priori categories. 
Lorenz rejects both of Kant’s metaphysical commitments in light of Darwin’s 
theory. He argues that the metaphysical concepts that enable an understanding of 
experience are physical constraints put in place by evolution and are knowable.
46
 Lorenz 
questions Kant, asking:  
Is not human reason with all its categories and forms of intuitions something that 
has organically evolved in a continuous cause-effect relationship with the laws of 
the immediate nature, just as has the human brain?…categories and forms of 
perception, fixed prior to individual experience, are adapted to the external world 
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for exactly the same reasons as the hoof of the horse is already adapted to the 
ground of the steppe before the horse is born…47  
 
Unlike Kant’s metaphysical a priori categories, Lorenz believes such categories are 
cognitive constraints put in place by evolution corresponding to the objective world.
48
 If 
this is right, then Kant’s metaphysical conception of the a priori remains physical and 
knowledge of the “thing in itself” becomes attainable.   
 Lorenz’s commitment to realism is apparent, suggesting that evolutionary theory 
provided faculties capable for generating objective knowledge about the world 
independent of human experience. This is because human cognitive faculties operated 
according to a truth-tracking mechanism – natural selection, in this case – independent of 
human perception. But there’s a catch. Lorenz’s argument requires accepting that a priori 
knowledge remains incomplete, since the process by which we obtain a priori knowledge 
originates through a posteriority.
49
 Humans could have evolved differently with greater a 
priori awareness or perhaps future evolution will yield an enhanced understanding of a 
priori knowledge.  As such, Lorenz states:  
One must realize that this conception of the ‘a priori’ as an organ means the 
destruction of the concept: something that has evolved in evolutionary adaptation 
to the laws of natural external world has endowed a posteriori in a certain sense, 
even if in a way entirely different from the abstraction or deduction from previous 
experience.
50
   
 
This passage implies that human cognitive evolution may provide a different 
understanding of a priori concepts and the “thing in itself,” suggesting that human 
                                                          
47
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knowledge operates as “a working hypothesis in the coping of our species with the 
absolute reality of the environment.”51Therefore, unlike knowledge traditionally 
construed by rationalists, Lorenz’s DE implies that human “a priori” knowledge remains 
liable to change if humans were to have evolved.
52
 
Lorenz’s commitment to realism draws criticism from proponents of DE, since it 
implies evolutionary adaptationism.
53
 This means that evolution selected traits 
corresponding with the objective world. But recent accounts of DE reject adaptationism, 
suggesting that DE must focus on non-adaptationist views of evolution.
54
Adaptationist 
accounts of evolution fail to incorporate the point of view of the organism and fall short 
of providing a sufficient picture of evolutionary theory. In his article, “The View from 
Somewhere,” Ruse rejects Lorenz’s realist and adaptationist approach, and instead 
applies Hume’s sceptical, non-realist philosophy with a non-adaptationist view of 
evolution.  
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C. Ruse’s Humean Skepticism   
Hume would have rejected Kant’s metaphysical certainty. For Hume the rational 
grounds for judgements about matters of fact, value, causation, and induction remain 
uncertain and unsettling: “The intense view of these manifold contradictions and 
imperfections in human reason has wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am 
ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more 
probable or likely than another”.55  
Not only does scepticism dominate Hume’s philosophy but any attempt to 
overcome sceptical biases confronts some insurmountable problems:  
This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the sense, is a malady, which 
can never be radically cured, but must return upon us every moment, however we 
may chase it away, and sometimes may seem entirely free from it.
56
  
 
Hume’s scepticism also implies non-realist views of the objective world, and, as noted, 
rejects knowledge beyond experience.
57
 Ruse agrees with Hume, and is uncomfortable 
with acknowledging a world independent of experience.
58
  
According to Ruse, non-adaptationist evolution supports Humean scepticism. The 
non-adaptationist view focuses on change that occurs from the point of view of the 
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organism and not solely from the pressure of the external environmental.
59 In fact, 
according to some, Darwin had already alluded to non-adaptationist views in The Origin: 
Naturalists continuously refer to external conditions, such as climate, food, etc., as 
the only possible source of variation. In one limited sense … this may be true; but 
it is preposterous to attribute to mere external conditions, the structure, for 
instance, of the woodpecker, with its feet, tail, back, and tongue, so admirably 
adapted to catch insects under the back of trees.
60
 
 
The point is that evolution would not have guaranteed the selection of cognitive faculties 
that would have accurately reflected the external world.
61
 Human faculties may have 
been selected for by the internal perception necessary for survival, regardless of whether 
those perceptions are reliable. As Franz Wuketits argues: 
From our everyday perspective stones are really stones, trees are really trees, 
wine-glasses are really wine-glasses, and so on and so forth. Well, but what else 
should these objects be, if not stones, trees, wine-glasses, etc.? This, however, is 
not the point. In our everyday life we may believe that all (perceived) things are 
as they appear to be. What counts is that our perceptions help us to survive.
62
      
 
Wuketits supports Ruse, arguing that living organisms are not puppets that passively 
accept environmental change, but are active participants inadvertently shaping 
evolutionary results.    
Ruse’s DE has two implications for epistemology. First, we should abandon 
metaphysical realism, and second, we should accept a coherence theory of truth – that is, 
that beliefs hang together within a coherent structure, with no guarantee that such beliefs 
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accurately describe the external world.
63
 Ruse adopts Hilary Putnam’s internal realist 
view, one that compromises between metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism, 
who writes as follows: 
One of these perspectives [on realism] is the perspective of metaphysical realism. 
On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent 
objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of “the way the world 
is.” Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between worlds or 
thought-signs and external things and sets of things.
64
   
 
But metaphysical realism is unintelligible, says Putnam:  
 
What does it mean . . . to speak of mind independency? Human minds did not 
create the stars or the mountains, but this “flat” remark is hardly enough to settle 
the philosophical question of realism versus anti-realism. What does it mean to 
speak of a unique true and complete description of the world?
65
 
 
Putnam’s rejection of metaphysical realism also precludes correspondence theories of 
truth, in exchange for supporting a coherence theory of truth: 
Truth, in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability—
some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and with our 
experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief 
system—and not correspondence with mind-independent of discourse-
independent states of affairs.
66
 
 
Putnam’s views have changed over time, and more recently adopts a “natural realism” 
that favours a common-sense approach. Even so, he maintains that a correspondence 
theory of truth remains deficient. Ruse does not abandon correspondence theory entirely 
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but asserts that a contemporary understanding of evolution implies that epistemology 
should favour a coherence theory of truth.  
Ruse’s application of Hume requires closer examination. First, DE cannot be 
extracted from a realist view insofar as evolutionary processes reflected an actual world 
independent of experience. How else could evolution have taken place? Changes that 
occur within a population reflect something, even if those changes are not perfect 
adaptations to the external world.
67
 Perhaps a more tempered non-adaptationist view 
should adopt Donald Campbell’s understanding:  
I…can’t do better than the example of the salamander’s leg: When it regenerates 
when broken off, does it regenerate until it reaches the ground? No! It regenerates 
until an internal vicarious monitor for leg length is completed. But if this regularly 
led to regenerated legs that were, say, too long, then an external selection would 
select mutations that adjusted that internal selector.
68
   
 
Internal monitors provide the necessary link between environment and adaptation. This 
means that environmental pressure acts upon external features of an organism but that 
those external features are controlled by internal monitors. These internal monitors do not 
always reflect the truth in the objective sense, but more often control physical features 
that garner adaptability. But even if Campbell is right, it doesn’t follow that Humean non-
realism is a plausible application of non-adaptationism, nor does it follow that 
adaptationist theories of cognition are entirely false.   
Similarly, David Sloan Wilson argues that a strong argument for adaptationism of 
mental representations must provide evidence of a phenotype-environment correlation. 
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This means that if the environment requires species to exhibit certain phenotypic traits to 
survive and reproduce, and species within those environments exhibit the right traits, then 
we possess a strong argument for adaptationism.
69
 According to Wilson, the problem 
with this view is that each ecosystem contains a multitude of different species exhibiting 
different necessary traits for survival and reproduction. This implies that different species 
would have perceived the environment in different ways while still exhibiting adaptive 
behaviour.   
Wilson concludes that human mental representations of the world are somewhat 
analogous to various species’ representation of the ecosystem. There are a variety of 
ways in which humans might perceive their environment – and, thus, behave differently 
for the purpose of survival and reproduction – without holding a direct mental correlation 
with the “real world.”  Adaptive behaviour requires only some instances of “real world” 
correlation.   
Suppose we accept a non-adaptationist approach to DE in support of non-realism, 
what follows? The answer may lie with distinguishing between maturational and 
practiced natural cognition. Recall that maturational capacities include pre-reflective 
skills while practiced natural capacities include more advanced skills. Maturational skills 
sometimes reflect a common-sense, non-realist picture of the world. For instance, the 
maturational natural belief that tables are solid objects is mostly false and does not reflect 
the “real” world.70 Even still, it doesn’t follow that one remains bound by maturational 
bias. Through practiced naturalness one can overcome the common-sense limitations 
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about the nature of solid objects and form a more accurate view: that tables are mostly 
empty space. The success of science is partially due to accurately describing the “real 
world.” The reason doctors can successfully transplant human kidneys is because they 
know true things about human bodies. This suggests that human cognition and its ability 
to overcome its evolved limitations is unique. This observation may further suggest that 
human cognition differs from other species in its ability to correlate knowledge with the 
real world.   
Even if the evolutionary past of human cognitive development is the result of a 
non-adaptationist paradigm and reflects a non-realist conception of the world, more 
recent cognitive development provides the capacity to overcome these restrictions and 
generate truth in the realist sense. Thus, granting Ruse’s argument for non-adaptationism, 
his application of Hume applies only to the distant evolutionary past and fails to 
incorporate a more sophisticated apparatus of human cognition. Perhaps at this point the 
non-adaptationist DE no longer applies. Indeed, if humans can overcome maturational 
biases and employ practiced naturalness, then perhaps the non-realist view of truth 
becomes more problematic.    
Summary:  
Evolutionary supporting strategies argue that natural selection is sufficient for 
explaining the nature of human cognitive capabilities, including non-adaptive belief.  
Darwin and Lorenz understood evolution as shaping natural cognition, such that faculties 
producing true belief resulting in survival would be passed down to future generations.  
According to Ruse, a flourishing DE should adopt a non-adaptationist view of evolution, 
implying that epistemology focus on coherence theories of truth and a rejection of 
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metaphysical realism. In the next section, I summarize and evaluate several popular 
debunking strategies and some reasons for affirming the Scope Objection’s second 
premise.   
II. EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS: MAPPING THE 
LANDSCAPE 
Alfred Russell Wallace thinks that ESAs are insufficient for explaining the nature 
of human cognitive capacities and non-adaptive beliefs. Others in the history of 
philosophy stress a similar hesitation for accepting the reliability of evolved faculties, 
most notably Friedrich Nietzsche and Thomas Nagel. Nietzsche argues that all human 
cognitive faculties are unreliable as a consequence of evolution. Nagel’s argument is 
more similar to Wallace’s than Nietzsche’s in that the cognitive capacities responsible for 
non-adaptive belief are beyond the scope of natural selection.  
A. Wallace’s Darwinism 
Wallace initially supported natural selection as the sole mechanism for the 
evolution of the human brain.
71
 Indeed, Darwin approved Wallace’s initial claim that 
eventually the brain would have become the chief target of selection and primary vehicle 
for incurring human survival and reproduction.
72
  
Wallace eventually rejected his thesis.
73
 In his book Darwinism, Wallace denies 
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that natural selection explains the “special faculties” possessed by humans,74 and attacks 
Darwin’s universal application of natural selection for explaining human cognition.75 By 
“special faculties” Wallace has in mind cognitive capacities responsible for spiritual, 
moral, and intellectual beliefs:  
…the existence in man of a number of his most characteristic and noblest 
faculties, those which raise him furthest above the brutes and open up possibilities 
of almost indefinite advancement. These faculties could not possibly have been 
developed by means of the same laws which have determined the progressive 
development of the organic world in general, and also of man’s physical 
organism.
76
 
 
In support of his scepticism, Wallace argues: 
…as far as we yet know, of the pre-historic races, we have an organ so little 
inferior in size and complexity to that of the highest types (such as the average 
European), that we must believe it capable, under a similar process of gradual 
development during the space of two or three thousand years, of producing equal 
average results. But the mental requirements of the lowest savages…are very little 
above those of many animals. The higher moral faculties and those of pure 
intellect and refined emotion are useless to them, are rarely if ever manifested, 
and have no relation to their wants, desires, or well-being. How, then, was an 
organ developed so far beyond the needs of its possessor?  Natural selection could 
only have endowed the savage with a brain of little superior to that of an ape, 
whereas he actually possess one but very little inferior to that of the average 
members of our learned society.
77
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in Theistic Contexts: Cognitive Dimensions.  Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 16, (2001): 227-250.  I’m thankful to 
Helen De Cruz for raising this point.  
 
74
 A.R. Wallace, Studies scientific & social. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan, 1900.  Cited from Gross, 
“Alfred Russell,” 502.   
 
75
 A.R. Wallace, “Darwinism Applied to Man,” in Darwinism (London: Macmillan, 1889).  The 
manuscript is online at: http://people.wku.edu/charles.smith/wallace/S724CH15.htm.  See also Michael Shermer, 
In Darwin’s Shadow: The Life and Science of Alfred Russell Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 
76
 A.R. Wallace, “Darwinism,” accessed July 26/13, 
http://people.wku.edu/charles.smith/wallace/S724CH15.htm.  Also see Shermer, In Darwin’s, 174-5. 
 
77
 Alfred Russell Wallace, 1869a. Sir Charles Lyell on geological climates and the origin of species, 
Reviews of principles of geology (10th ed.), 1867–68, and Elements of geology (6th ed.) 1865, both by Sir Charles 
Lyell]. Q Rev 126:359–394.  This quotation was cited from Charles Gross, “Alfred Russell Wallace and the 
evolution of the human mind,” Neuroscientist, 16 (2010): 500; Stephen Jay Gould, “Wallace’s fatal flaw.” Natural 
History (1980): 89:26–40 
 
 
 
15 
 
Although a contemporary reading of Wallace would reject his appraisal of the human 
race, S.J. Gould notes that Wallace’s arguments are noteworthy and beyond his time; 
Gould notes:   
Wallace advanced several arguments for the uniqueness of human intellect, but 
his central claim begins with an extremely uncommon position for his time, one 
that commands our highest praise in retrospect. Wallace was one of the few 
nonracists of the nineteenth century. He really believed that all human groups had 
innately equal capacities of intellect.
78
  
 
Wallace thinks that every human shares innate capacities for generating non-adaptive 
beliefs. But unlike Darwin, to Wallace this observation seemed at odds with his 
understanding of human evolution. Thus, Wallace concludes that, “while admitting to the 
full extent the agency of the same great laws of organic development in the origin of the 
human race as in the origin of all organized beings, yet there seems to be a Power which 
has guided the action of those laws (of organic development) in definite directions and 
for special ends.”79  
Wallace often appealed to spirituality; indeed, he was a committed dualist and 
Mesmer.
80
 But Wallace did not consider his spirituality at odds with natural science. 
Rather, spiritual truth could provide explanation where science failed.
81
 Whether for a 
commitment to spirituality or a lack of scientific evidence, Wallace departed from 
Darwin and rejected the universal application of natural selection.
82
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Wallace rejects the explanatory scope of natural selection and thus challenges DE, 
since the causal belief-forming mechanism responsible for producing DE would have 
been invisible to selection. Wallace expounds an early debunking strategy in that many 
scientific and philosophical faculties would not have been within the selective purview of 
evolution and therefore attempting to ground the reliability of these non-adaptive 
faculties in evolutionary theory remains unsupported.  
Wallace sets the stage for a future line of evolutionary scepticism. But unlike 
Wallace, Nietzsche’s scepticism goes beyond non-adaptive belief, and criticizes the 
reliability of human cognitive faculties more generally.   
B. Nietzsche and The Gay Science 
Lorenz was not the only one to contemporize Kant insofar as evolution impacted 
human cognitive faculties. Nietzsche argued that evolution replaces the Kantian question 
about knowledge, arguing that truth and our modes of justification are the result of 
cognitive mechanisms operating for incurring survival:  
It is high time to replace the Kantian question, ‘How are [a priori moral 
judgements] possible?’ by another question, ‘Why is belief in such judgements 
necessary?’ – and to comprehend that such judgements must be believed to be 
true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they 
might of course be false judgements for all that!
83
 
 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche argues that true belief does not correspond to the objective 
world, but represents belief that comes with age, “on the degree to which [knowledge] 
has been incorporated, on its character as a condition of life.”84 Thus, Nietzsche’s 
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epistemology adopts Darwinian overtones: 
Over immense periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of 
these proved to be useful and helpful to preserve the species: those who hit upon 
or inherited these had better luck in their struggle for themselves and their 
progeny. Such erroneous articles of faith, which were continuously inherited, until 
they became almost part of the basic endowment of the species, include the 
following: that there are enduring things; that there are equal things; that there are 
things, substances, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that our will is 
free; that what is good for me is also good in itself.
85
   
 
Nietzsche’s epistemology is not reassuring for generating true belief. As such, he draws 
the opposite conclusion to Lorenz and more closely resembles Hume. One commentator 
notes:  
Nietzsche insists that there is no such thing as absolute truth, and argues instead 
that all thinking and perception comes from a particular perspective, and that 
different perspectives will produce different views of truth. There are only these 
views of truth, or interpretations; there is no objective reality beneath them, no 
independent standard that they refer to.
86
     
 
Nietzsche’s view does not entail that all beliefs are false, only that we lack the 
support (i.e. the justification) for their truth and falsity. Nietzsche articulates his 
skepticism clearly in the following passage:  
It is unfair to Descartes to call his appeal to God’s credibility frivolous. Indeed, 
only if we assume a God who is morally our like can “truth” and the search for 
truth be at all something meaningful and promising of success. This God left 
aside, the question is permitted whether being deceived is not one of the 
conditions of life.
87
  
 
This means that without a theistic ontology, natural forces would not guarantee the 
reliability of human cognitive faculties. Nietzsche seems to suggest that the implications 
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of evolution for epistemology are that all truth becomes unsupported if our faculties were 
to have evolved. This is a radical view, and one not necessarily shared by contemporary 
debunking strategies.   
C. Nagel’s Darwinian Scepticism  
  Similar to Wallace, and more charitable than Nietzsche, Thomas Nagel has long 
been sceptical about the explanatory force of reductive science in general and 
evolutionary theory in particular.
88
 His reason for doubting DE derives from the 
conviction that in order to ascertain DE, one must postulate an evolutionary story 
explaining the development of non-adaptive faculties, and one must already assume a 
concept of reason that is independent of biological origin. But unlike Wallace, Nagel 
does not appeal to spirituality but rather postulates a naturalized teleology within 
biological processes.    
In his earlier work, Nagel figures that evolutionary accounts of non-adaptive 
belief face problems similar to those noted by Wallace: “The question is whether not only 
the physical but the mental capacity needed to make a stone axe automatically bring with 
it the capacity to take each of the steps that have led from there to the construction of the 
hydrogen bomb….I see absolutely no reason to believe that the truth lies within a 
[Darwinian explanation].
89
 Rejecting arguments of this sort is common for Nagel, dating 
back to his previous work “What is it like to be a bat?” by which he rejects a scientific 
(and a materialist reductionist) explanation for subjective experience.
90
 Nagel’s recent 
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work, Mind and Cosmos, raise similar concerns. Although Nagel expresses doubt about 
the scope of evolutionary theory in general, he considers the implications of evolution for 
human cognition more specifically.
91
  
According to Nagel, a successful DE must overcome two obstacles.
92
 The first is 
that evolution did not generate faculties for non-adaptive belief: “that natural selection 
should have generated creatures with the capacity to discover by reason the truth about a 
reality that extends vastly beyond initial appearance – as we take ourselves to have done 
and continue to do collectively in science, logic, and ethics.”93 The second obstacle is 
attempting to explain the faculty of reason responsible for non-adaptive belief in a 
naturalistic way.
94
   
Nagel illustrates the first obstacle by summarizing a common “just so” story about 
evolution and the positive impact on human cognitive faculties:  
[Proponents must]…explain how innate mental capacities that were selected for 
their immediate adaptive value are also capable of generating, through extended 
cultural evolutionary history, true theories about a law-governed natural order that 
there was no adaptive need to understand earlier.95 
 
Even in the wild, it isn’t just perception and operant conditioning that have 
survival value. The capacity to generalize from experience and to allow those 
generalizations, or general expectations, to be confirmed or disconfirmed by 
subsequent experience is also adaptive. So is a basic disposition to maintain 
logical consistency in belief, by modifying beliefs when inconsistencies arise. A 
further, very important step would be the capacity to correct individual 
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appearances not only by reference to other conflicting appearances of one’s own 
but also by reference to how things appear to other perceivers.  That requires 
recognition of other minds, an ability with obvious adaptive potential.  The reach 
of these capacities can be greatly extended and deliberately exercised with the 
help of language, which also allows knowledge to be collectively created, 
accumulated, and transmitted.  With language we can hold in our minds and share 
with others alternative possibilities, and decide among them on the basis of their 
consistency or inconsistency with further observations.  Complex scientific 
theories that entail empirical predictions are therefore extensions of the highly 
adaptive capacity to learn from experience – our own and that of others.96      
 
He thinks such accounts are improbable, especially when they include the manifestation 
of non-adaptive belief. Nevertheless, he’s willing to grant the argument and proceeds to 
the second obstacle. He argues that reason is beyond the scope of evolutionary theory 
since reason is presupposed by an understanding of the process itself.  
For the present purpose, the relevant objection is the first one. How does Nagel 
know that evolutionary processes lack the potential for producing faculties in non-
adaptive domains of belief?
97
 Caution should be taken before dismissing a scientific 
hypothesis as evidentially exhausted. This does not imply that science explains 
everything; indeed, perhaps explaining the evolution of such faculties is beyond the scope 
of scientific explanation. But then Nagel must demonstrate that either the evolution of 
non-adaptive faculties can never be evidentially supported or that such explanations lie 
beyond the domain of science. Nagel fails to address either question. He concedes such 
evolutionary story-telling and then proceeds to his second objection. 
There is no reason to accept Nagel’s first objection, especially when his 
evolutionary story is contingent on accepting both natural selection as the primary vehicle 
for shaping cognition, as well as upholding an adaptationist view of evolutionary 
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processes. But as noted, it is possible that both of these evolutionary concepts lack the 
proper nuance for explaining the subtleties of cognitive evolution.   
Summary: 
Wallace, Nietzsche and Nagel think that evolutionary supporting strategies are 
overly optimistic about evolution and its explanatory scope. Darwin and Wallace parted 
ways on the issue, while Nietzschean scepticism attacks the reliability of all human 
faculties. For Nagel, the essential problem for DE is that evolutionary processes cannot 
explain the development of human faculties responsible for non-adaptive beliefs, and in 
order to postulate an evolutionary account of reason, one must already assume reason 
independent of evolutionary forces.     
Although this summary serves as only a basic analysis for understanding 
debunking strategies, it is hard to identify the problem. What exactly is the argument that 
undermines the descriptive process by which evolution generated reliable cognitive 
faculties responsible for non-adaptive beliefs? Both Nietzsche and Nagel hint that 
evolutionary processes would have provided reliable cognitive mechanisms for incurring 
fitness and reproductive advantage. And both argue that non-adaptive domains are 
beyond the scope of evolutionary processes. But it is hard to identify their reasons for 
asserting this position. Wallace’s skepticism relates with his observation of the diversity 
of the human race. But why exactly was natural selection (or perhaps other evolutionary 
mechanisms) incapable of supplying reliable mechanisms for higher intelligence across 
the human race.  
Thus, it seems that prima facie debunking strategies do not offer much by way of 
argument and therefore it remains difficult to assess the strength of the Scope Objection.     
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III. CONCLUSION 
A brief history of DE raises conflicting accounts about evolution and the 
implications for epistemology. ESAs affirm that evolution supplied cognitive faculties for 
generating true belief while EDAs deny this conclusion. More recently, evolutionary 
supporting strategies articulate their defense by way of linking non-adaptive beliefs with 
common-sense cognition. Evolutionary processes were sufficient for producing reliable 
common-sense cognition and from this fact proponents of ESAs postulate the 
manifestation of non-adaptive belief. In the next chapter, I consider two conflicting 
arguments: Plantinga’s evolutionary debunking strategy and Griffiths’ and Wilkins’ 
evolutionary supporting strategy. Plantinga grants that evolution was sufficient for 
generating common-sense mechanisms but lacks the scope for including faculties in non-
adaptive domains. Griffiths and Wilkins defend a common-sense ESA and then argue 
that such capacities are sufficient for including non-adaptive domains. The point is to 
navigate both arguments to establish a common ground: evolutionary processes are 
sufficient for explaining the development of common-sense faculties. And from this we 
can infer the main point of contention: that evolution did not supply us with reliable 
faculties in non-adaptive domains of belief.
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Chapter 2 
The Scope Objection to Darwinian Epistemology 
In this chapter I consider arguments by Alvin Plantinga, Paul Griffiths, and John 
Wilkins. Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) claims that the 
probability that human cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution is 
low. Griffiths and Wilkins argue that evolution selected reliable common-sense faculties 
and that this reliability supports scientific beliefs. My aim is to acquire details from both 
arguments in order to suggest that evolution supplied reliable cognitive faculties in 
common-sense domains. From this we can properly outline the Scope Objection at the 
end of the chapter. 
I. PLANTINGA’S EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING ARGUMENT 
In this section I summarize EAAN, noting the particulars that are relevant for 
understanding the Scope Objection. Plantinga doesn’t reject evolutionary theory – guided 
or unguided – nor does he attack the position that evolution results in cognitive 
unreliability. Rather, Plantinga’s aim is to argue against metaphysical naturalism by way 
of evolution. But in the process, Plantinga argues that unguided evolution results in a 
universal scepticism about true belief. 
A. The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism  
EAAN attacks naturalism generally and materialism in particular by raising a 
conflict between naturalism and evolution. More precisely, although it is possible to 
believe that either naturalism or evolution is true, one cannot rationally believe both 
positions in conjunction. Plantinga’s EAAN can be summarized as follows: where the 
proposition R represents the claim that human cognitive faculties are reliable, N is the 
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claim that naturalism is true, and E is the claim that human cognitive faculties are the 
product of evolution by natural selection.
98
   
1. P(R/N&E) is low. 
2. Anyone who believes N&E and sees that P(R/N&E) is low has a defeater for R. 
3. Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for any other belief she thinks she 
has, including N&E. 
4. If anyone who accepts N&E thereby acquires a defeater for N&E, N&E will be 
self-defeating and can’t rationally be accepted. 
5. So, N&E can’t rationally be accepted.  
1. Premise One: Darwin’s Doubt        
The first premise states that the probability that human cognitive faculties are 
reliable given naturalism and evolution is low. Plantinga supports premise one by citing 
Darwin, who doubts the reliability of human cognitive faculties given their evolutionary 
origin; Darwin states, “With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the conviction of 
man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any 
value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if 
there are any convictions in such a mind?”99 
Expanding on “Darwin’s doubt,” Plantinga then considers the contemporary 
philosopher Patricia Churchland and her description of the four “F’s”:  
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in 
the four F’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principal chore of the 
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nervous system is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the 
organism may survive…Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an 
evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as 
it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances of 
survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitively takes the hindmost.
100
  
 
Churchland argues that evolution forged cognition for the purpose of adaptive behaviour 
– that is, the nervous system getting the right parts in the right place for increasing 
survival – and thus evolution does not make true belief probable.101 In support of 
Churchland’s claim, Plantinga examines both reductive and non-reductive conceptions of 
belief and concludes that neither conception provides sufficient reason for denying the 
first premise.    
i. Reductive and Non-reductive Materialism 
The materialist argues that a belief is an event in the brain and nervous system.
102
  
More specifically, a belief is built on the neurophysiological properties (hereafter, NP 
properties) of the brain that interact with the nervous system providing adaptive 
behaviour.
103
 Beliefs also include propositional content. The belief that “all men are 
mortal” includes the propositional content that “all men are mortal” and it is the content 
of a belief that is true or false. So, a belief according to the materialist has two properties, 
one physical and one mental: the NP properties affecting the nervous system providing 
adaptive behaviour and the propositional content determining the truth or falsity of the 
belief.  
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The reductive materialist thinks that beliefs are reduced to NP properties; that is, a 
belief is just the NP properties that constitute the belief. Conversely, non-reductive 
conceptions of belief argue that beliefs supervene on NP properties. This acknowledges 
the dependency relation between beliefs and their correlated NP properties and 
reductionism is precluded altogether. Either way, Plantinga argues that both reductive 
and non-reductive conceptions of belief are determined by their correlated NP 
properties.
104
 
ii. Materialism and EAAN 
Both reductive and non-reductive materialists accept that NP properties determine 
the content of belief. But is this content true? Plantinga answers this question by 
considering the C. elegans worm.
105
 If Churchland is correct, then the survival of C. 
elegans depends on the adaptability of its NP properties to a given environment.
106
 C. 
elegans also generates propositional content reduced to or supervening on its NP 
properties. But why should we think that this propositional content is true? We shouldn’t, 
according to Plantinga. The content of C. elegans’ belief is irrelevant for achieving 
adaptive behaviour. The propositional content could be true but it’s just as likely to be 
false. In the least, the probability that C. elegans’ faculties are reliable in forming true 
belief given evolutionary processes remains low or inscrutable. 
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A helpful example illustrating Plantinga’s claim is the hyper-sensitive agency 
detection device (HADD, for short).
107
 HADD is a cognitive tool with the purpose of 
triggering belief that agency is present within one’s environment. You’re walking down a 
dark alley and hear a noise behind you. In this case HADD triggers a reflex of fear, 
causing you to either fight or flee. Thus, HADD is a form of protection useful for survival 
and thus under the power of selection. The upshot is that false positive triggers are also a 
cheap form of protection: the noise in the dark alley is just the wind, yet HADD triggers 
nonetheless. Why do false positives occur? They occur because nature selected affordable 
mechanisms that provide adaptive behaviour.
108
 So HADD’s trigger does not depend on 
the truth of the propositional content– i.e. according to the content that “it is true that 
there is a predator behind me” – but rather according to the NP properties getting the 
right parts in the right place in forming the reflexive reaction. In this case, the formation 
of HADD does not depend on propositional truth but just adaptive behaviour.  
If the formation of human cognitive faculties isn’t contingent on the content of 
true belief, then why think that our cognitive infrastructure is reliable? According to 
Plantinga, we should favour that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable. That is to say, like 
Nietzsche and Darwin, we should doubt the reliability of human belief-forming faculties 
given their evolutionary origin.
109
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2. Remaining premises  
Suppose the naturalist accepts that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, what follows?  
The second premise indicates that if premise one is true, then one acquires a defeater for 
R. Suppose there is a toxic drug called XX that after consumption results in unreliable 
cognitive faculties. Suppose that Mary consumes XX. The result is that she now faces a 
defeater that undermines the reliability of her cognitive faculties: that is, she faces a 
defeater for R. As such, accepting premise one is analogous to consuming XX. Mary is in 
a state such that she cannot trust the reliability of her cognitive faculties. 
Premises three and four state that if one acquires a defeater for R, then one also 
acquires a defeater for all beliefs produced by R. But if this is true, then one should doubt 
the belief that both naturalism and evolution are true.
110
 In other words, according to 
Plantinga naturalism in conjunction with evolution provides reason to doubt that both 
naturalism and evolution are true. It follows that if the premises are true, then the 
conclusion must be true and naturalism cannot be rationally accepted. As Ruse 
comments, if Plantinga is right, then everything “collapses into a contradictory mess, the 
whole Darwinian epistemology ends in a reductio ad absurdum.”111  
3. Responses to EAAN  
In what follows, I consider some objections to EAAN and responses to these 
objections and then bring EAAN into sharper focus with the Scope Objection.    
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i. Thomas Crisp’s weaker EAAN  
One criticism to EAAN is that it is likely that evolution would have supplied 
reliable faculties in common-sense domains.
112
 For example, individual organisms within 
a population applying reliable perception are likely to survive and reproduce. In light of 
this objection, Thomas Crisp defends a weaker version of EAAN. Crisp attacks 
naturalism by assigning a low probability to the reliability of recondite philosophical 
faculties.
113
 His argument can be formulated as such: P(Rr/A&E) is inscrutable, where Rr 
is the probability that recondite philosophical faculties are reliable, A is atheism, and E is 
the fact that human cognitive faculties are the product of evolution.
114
   
Why think that P(Rr/A&E) is inscrutable? According to Crisp, it is inscrutable 
because human faculties result from the blind, unguided forces of evolution. How does a 
blind process responsible for the selection of adaptive traits within a population favour 
abstract philosophical faculties?
115
 Or suppose that human philosophical faculties are by-
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products of evolution – faculties existing on the basis of other adaptive traits.116 Crisp 
grants the possibility, but suggests there is no good argument supporting this claim.
117
 
Crisp’s version of EAAN is important for articulating Plantinga’s weaker EAAN. But 
first, there is an important objection to both Plantinga and Crisp that requires attention. 
ii. Michael Bergmann and Common-sense Naturalism 
Michael Bergmann criticizes both accounts of EAAN.  Bergmann argues that 
even if the naturalist accepts that P(R/N&E) is low, this does not amount to a defeater for 
R. The naturalist may draw upon non-propositional evidence following Thomas Reid’s 
common-sense epistemology to support N. This move justifies R even if one holds that 
P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable.
118
 In support of this rebuttal, Bergmann appeals to 
Plantinga’s response to the problem of evil.119   
In responding to the problem of evil, Plantinga argues that even if we have good 
circumstantial evidence against a belief that p, we may rationally hold p so long as we 
obtain additional non-propositional evidence. Suppose there’s good circumstantial 
evidence claiming that you stole a letter from work. You respond to the charges with an 
                                                          
116
 Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin, “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Program,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 
Vol. 205, No. 1161 (1979): 581-598. Crisp allows this possibility, and yet seems to think that we have no 
good argument for supporting this claim. As we have seen, Sober and Ruse reject this line of thought. 
 
117
 Myron A. Penner raises an important point here. Suppose that the faculties responsible for non-
adaptive beliefs are simple by-products of evolution, as Crisp grants. Isn’t this fact sufficient to undermine 
premise 2 without explicating the evolution of practiced naturalness?  If so, then this would be another way 
to reject premise 2 of the scope objection. This point may raise additional questions about whether spandrel 
accounts of non-adaptive cognition satisfy externalist accounts of justification for non-adaptive beliefs. But 
these questions are beyond the scope of this project.  
 
118
 Michael Bergmann, “Commonsense Naturalism,” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (ed. By James Beliby; Cornell University Press, 
2002), 82-8.   
 
119
 Alvin Plantinga, “Epistemic Probability and Evil,” in Daniel Howard-Snyder, 
ed., The Evidential Problem of Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1996), 69-96. 
 
 
 
31 
 
alibi: you remember walking in the woods at the time of the theft. Your colleagues 
disagree; they doubt that you were walking in the woods at the time of the theft and 
maintain that the circumstantial evidence overrides your alibi. Consider then the 
following: P (W/k) is low, where W represents you walking in the woods at the time of 
the theft, and k is the circumstantial evidence claiming that you stole the letter. Suppose 
that both you and your colleagues agree that P(W/k) is low. Even if this is true, Plantinga 
argues that you have access to non-propositional evidence unavailable to your colleagues, 
such as your memory. If your memory provides a sufficient and reliable experience, then 
you are rational to believe that W is true despite the fact that P(W/k) is low.
120
 Plantinga 
responds to the problem of evil in a similar way. Despite the circumstantial evidence 
from evil against God’s existence, theists may support belief that God exists provided 
they obtain sufficient, non-propositional evidence.    
Bergmann applies Plantinga’s response to the problem of evil to criticize EAAN.  
Even if the naturalist accepts premise 1, they may appeal to their non-propositional 
common-sense beliefs in support of naturalism. Following Thomas Reid’s definition of 
common sense, Bergmann considers the faculty responsible for generating the emotion of 
ridicule; Reid says:
121
  
We may observe that opinions which contradict first principles are distinguished 
from other errors by this; that they are not only false, but absurd: and, to 
discountenance absurdity, nature has given us a particular emotion, to wit, that of 
ridicule, which seems intended for this very purpose of putting out of countenance 
what is absurd, either in opinion or practice.
122
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According to Bergmann, the atheist may appeal to non-propositional common-
sense beliefs to support their recondite philosophical belief. Plantinga replies to 
Bergmann, but more relevant for the present purpose is Crisp’s response: 
Why don’t I have such non-propositional evidence for my belief that my 
philosophical faculties are reliable? I don’t experience any emotion of ridicule 
when I entertain the possibility that my cognitive faculties are unreliable with 
respect to obtuse philosophical matters far removed from the everyday concerns 
of life. That possibility doesn’t strike me as crazy or ridiculous. I don’t notice any 
powerful seeming or seeing to be true when I consider the proposition that my 
philosophical faculties are reliable; it doesn’t strike me as just obvious that they 
are. In fact, when I consider the multitude of crazy views philosophers have 
defended over the centuries and the rampant disagreement among philosophers 
over almost of everything of substance, I find it wholly unobvious that we 
humans, myself included, have reliable philosophical faculties.
123
 
 
Crisp asks how the faculty responsible for the emotion of ridicule (or any common-sense 
faculty) could substantiate the warrant for recondite philosophical beliefs.  It is unclear 
why appealing to common sense warrants beliefs beyond the scope of common-sense 
domains.  Bergmann must defend this explanatory gap.  
4. Plantinga’s weaker EAAN 
Plantinga’s recent version of EAAN grants Crisp’s weaker argument: 
Perhaps those faculties that produce beliefs that appear to be relevant to survival 
and reproduction are more likely to be reliable than those faculties that produce 
beliefs of other kinds.  For example, one might think that perceptual beliefs are 
often more likely to be relevant to adaptive behaviour than beliefs about, say, art 
criticism, or postmodernism, or string theory.
124
  
 
Consider the following argument by Plantinga: P(MR/N&E) is low, where MR is the 
proposition that metaphysical faculties (and philosophical faculties generally) are formed 
in a reliable way and generate true belief. Even in this case, naturalism in conjunction 
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with evolution undermines MR. So, according to Plantinga the probability that 
philosophical faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution remains low or 
inscrutable. 
Summary:  
Plantinga allows Crisp’s version of EAAN for argument’s sake, accepting the 
reliability of common-sense faculties. Thus, Plantinga’s weaker EAAN – that 
P(MR/N&E) is low – grants that adaptive, common-sense faculties deliver true, common-
sense beliefs. But why think that Plantinga’s weaker argument is true? Why think that 
evolution accounts for reliable, common-sense faculties at all? Plantinga only grants the 
argument. Establishing the evolution of reliable common-sense cognition requires 
additional support.   
II. GRIFFITHS AND WILKINS’ EVOLUTIONARY SUPPORTING ARGUMENT  
Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins (hereafter, GW) argue that evolution would have 
selected reliable common-sense cognition. GW then argue that common-sense reliability 
substantiates scientific beliefs but not moral and religious beliefs. My purpose for the 
Scope Objection is to focus on the first part of GW’s argument regarding the selection of 
common-sense faculties. 
A. True Belief and Pragmatic Success 
GW defend their evolutionary supporting strategy by focusing on the link 
between true belief and pragmatic success. Before defending this claim, GW respond to 
two challenges of evolutionary skepticism, outlined in the following argument:
125
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6. Evolution did not select for truth-tracking unless truth-tracking coincides with 
fitness. 
7. The fittest belief forming mechanisms are not always those designed to produce 
the largest proportion of true beliefs, or the most accurate beliefs. 
8. Therefore, we should not have a general expectation that evolved organisms will 
track truth.  
GW focus on premise seven, suggesting that: (i) fitness-tracking and truth-tracking 
coincide, even though (ii) evolution also selected unreliable cognitive faculties. These 
two claims require closer examination. 
  In support of (i), GW describe the evolution of frog communication. Although 
frogs normally use vocalization to communicate with their conspecific, they have also 
developed communication by leg-waving.
126
 There are two advantages to leg-waving.  
First, leg-waving is quiet, thereby increasing the avoidance of predators.  Second, leg 
waving is advantageous in noisy environments because of its visual cue. But what was 
the target of selection, quiet leg-waving or visible leg-waving? Even if the target of 
selection was one feature over another, this does not imply that each target is an 
alternative to fitness. That is, it makes no sense to say that evolution selected for visible 
leg-waving or fitness. Both targets of selection, jointly or individually, have the potential 
for contributing to the overall fitness of frogs. In a similar way, truth-tracking is not an 
alternative to fitness but remains a property for contributing to fitness. Even if another 
feature was selected over truth-tracking, this does not preclude truth-tracking and does 
not imply that evolution selected for fitness over truth.   
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The main point is that truth-tracking and fitness tracking are not alternative targets 
of selection; and, thus, truth-tracking coincides with fitness. Truth-tracking is a measure 
of ecological interaction exhibited by an organism in correlation with its environment.
127
  
If an organism tracks truth more effectively than its conspecific, change within the 
population would have been more likely to favour truth-tracking. Thus, (i) is probably 
true.   
The second claim is that evolution was more likely to have selected unreliable 
cognitive faculties. But according to GW, even if this is true, it doesn’t follow that 
evolution failed to select for truth-tracking. That is because truth-tracking is a property of 
fitness, as (i) contends, and that fitness determines the degree to which truth-tracking 
applies. That is, truth-tracking is under the constraint of overall fitness. Consider GW’s 
argument in support of (ii):  
9. If our evolved cognitive mechanisms were not selected for tracking truth, then 
either they are not adaptations, or they were selected for some other, substantial 
ecological benefit.  
10. The hypothesis that human cognitive mechanisms are not adaptations is highly 
implausible because they are so expensive.  
11. So, our evolved cognitive mechanisms are probably adaptations.  
12. If they are not adaptations for truth-tracking, then they must be adaptations for 
something else. 
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13. But it’s hard to see what cognition could be selected for other than tracking 
truth.
128
 
14. So, our evolved cognitive machinery has evolved for truth-tracking.” 
GW defend premise ten by detailing the cost of the human brain. One fundamental 
constraint to selection is cost. The human brain is only 2% of total body mass, yet it 
requires 20% total oxygen to function. Thus, following premises nine and ten, human 
cognitive mechanisms are costly and are therefore adaptations. Premises twelve and 
thirteen support truth-tracking as the only viable explanation for why human faculties are 
adaptations. In order to reject these premises, critics must suggest another reason why 
human cognitive mechanisms are adaptations. So, the conclusion follows.   
 The argument suggests that evolution selected for truth-tracking faculties in order 
to maximize fitness, provided this selection was not overly disadvantageous. If that is 
right, then it becomes easier to understand why (ii) is true, but does not preclude the 
selection of reliable cognitive faculties, since fitness constrains truth-tracking.  
Therefore, even if premise eight is true, it doesn’t imply that evolutionary 
processes failed to select cognitive capacities that track truth. This latter claim is perfectly 
consistent with both objections from evolutionary skepticism, provided fitness constrains 
truth-tracking and both modes of tracking coincide 
B. Common-sense Beliefs and Pragmatic Behaviour  
According to GW, a precise definition of a truth-tracking cognitive faculty 
includes the following: “Organisms track truth optimally if they obtain as much relevant 
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truth as they can afford, and tolerate no more error than is needed to obtain it.”129  
Common-sense beliefs follow suit. Common-sense beliefs may be false in certain 
domains since they are the product of faculties forged in the struggle for survival. Hence, 
common-sense faculties generated true belief only insofar as fitness required.
130
    
In support of GW’s claim, consider again Reid’s common-sense epistemology in 
relation to cognitive science. Reid argues that common-sense faculties should be 
considered reliable unless shown otherwise. According to cognitive scientist Justin 
Barrett, Reid’s common-sense faculties resemble non-reflective beliefs in naïve physics: 
belief in other minds and that biological species give birth to their own kind.
131
  
The problem with naïve physics is that they are restricted to specific domains, 
producing false beliefs beyond the scope of their design.
132
 Anthropologist Scot Atran 
argues, 
By nature, human minds everywhere are endowed with common sense. They 
possess universal cognitive dispositions that determine a core of spontaneously 
formulated representations about the world. The world is basically represented in 
the same way in every culture. Core concepts and beliefs about the world are 
easily acquired . . . yet they are restricted to certain cognitive domains and are 
rather fixed.
133
     
 
In short, non-reflective, common-sense faculties that include naïve physics generate true 
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belief, but remain defective in various circumstances beyond the scope of their proper 
function.
134
 But this seems to be enough to defend GW’s claim.  
Although naïve physics generate false beliefs in certain domains, this does not 
preclude their truth-tracking potential.
135
 Moreover, true beliefs delivered by naïve 
physics would have resulted in pragmatic behaviour. Consider perceptual faculties. 
Although fallible, perception tracks truth in domains necessary for enhancing fitness (e.g. 
navigating uneven terrain, night vision, and so forth.) Even if perceptual faculties 
function in unreliable ways (say, by creating optical illusions), they still track truth within 
the normal environment for which they were designed. So, evolution selected faculties 
responsible for common-sense naïve physics so long as those faculties generated 
pragmatic beliefs and were not adverse to overall fitness. 
Summary: 
GW argue that evolution selected reliable common-sense faculties that function 
according to the overall fitness of an organism. In defense of this claim, GW clarify the 
false distinction between truth-tracking and fitness-tracking such that truth-tracking is a 
property contributing to fitness and not an alternative to fitness. Correcting the distinction 
between the two forms of tracking solves the second problem of unreliable cognition. 
Evolution would have selected some unreliable cognitive faculties only when truth-
tracking interfered with overall fitness. With these details in place, consider the Scope 
Objection in detail. 
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III. The Scope Objection  
Plantinga grants that evolution supplied reliable common-sense faculties while 
GW support this weaker claim. The point of contention is whether evolution accounts for 
the reliability of faculties in non-adaptive domains of belief. Consider now the Scope 
Objection to DE. 
15. DE is plausible only if evolution supplied us with the natural cognitive capacities 
for achieving non-adaptive beliefs. 
16. Evolution did not supply us with the natural cognitive capacities for achieving 
non-adaptive beliefs. 
17. So, DE is implausible. 
The Scope Objection concludes that DE is implausible since evolution did not supply 
reliable cognitive faculties for producing non-adaptive beliefs. Consider each premise 
more closely.   
Premise twenty-three states a necessary condition for the plausibility of DE. In 
order to achieve DE, evolution must have supplied the right cognitive faculties for non-
adaptive belief. This seems uncontroversial since DE requires non-adaptive beliefs. That 
is, if evolution did not supply faculties responsible for non-adaptive beliefs, then how 
could the non-adaptive application of DE ground itself within evolution? 
Premise twenty-four is more controversial. It denies that evolution supplied the 
required belief-forming faculties for achieving DE. That is to say, evolution only supplied 
reliable faculties in common-sense domains, not faculties responsible for systematic 
theories of epistemology. If this is right, then the conclusion follows. But why think that 
this premise is true? Why think that evolutionary processes cannot account for the 
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reliability of faculties in non-adaptive domains? As we shall see, there are two ways to 
respond to this premise. The first way is to postulate scientific hypotheses that support 
the evolution of such faculties, while the second way includes assessing whether or not 
such a process is even logically possible.
136
   
IV. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I briefly examined Plantinga’s EDA and Griffiths’ and Wilkins’ 
common-sense ESA. Although these authors argue beyond my respective claims, my 
purpose is to establish a general consensus that evolution supplied reliable, common-
sense cognition. Thus, we can present the Scope Objection to DE: that evolution did not 
supply us with the natural cognitive capacities for achieving non-adaptive true beliefs. In 
the next chapter I reject the Scope Objection by nuancing the term natural cognition and 
by offering reasons for thinking that evolution supplied faculties responsible for non-
adaptive beliefs  
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Chapter 3 
The Evolution of Practiced Natural Cognition 
In this chapter I respond to the Scope Objection by denying its second premise: 
that evolution did not supply us with the natural cognitive capacities for achieving non-
adaptive true beliefs. I evaluate Robert McCauley’s distinction between maturationally 
natural cognition and practiced natural cognition and note how the application and 
evolution of practiced naturalness is sufficient for defending the plausibility of DE. My 
response to the Scope Objection requires defending two contentions. First, I nuance the 
term “natural” in order to distinguish between two types of natural cognition, one of 
which overcomes evolved limitations. Second, I assess two criteria necessary for the rise 
of science as an example of practiced natural cognition and note how evolution supplied 
faculties as such.
137
 If this is true, then it seems plausible that evolution supplied the 
natural cognition responsible for non-adaptive beliefs more generally, including 
systematic theories of epistemology.   
I. Natural Cognition and the Scope Objection  
In this section I examine McCauley’s definition of natural cognition and then 
consider the implications for the Scope Objection. McCauley notes that evolution would 
have supplied common-sense cognition, but that these capacities are insufficient for 
generating non-adaptive beliefs.
138
 If natural cognition only specifies maturational 
naturalness, then the Scope Objection succeeds. But limiting the definition of natural 
cognition in this way is false, according to McCauley. Humans also possess practiced 
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natural capacities that provide cognitive abilities beyond common-sense domains.
139
   
A. Natural Cognition  
Natural cognition generates skills non-reflectively. This means that humans can 
apply cognitive abilities without the need for deliberation, unlike reflective skills that 
operate slowly and require deliberation. The primary mode of reflective development is 
through the process of reading off already instilled mental tools responsible for non-
reflective beliefs. A man runs out of a retail store with a large bulge in his shirt knocking 
over the store clerk. Several non-reflective mental tools participate to create a single 
reflective belief: that the man is shoplifting.
140
  
According to McCauley, non-reflective skills divide into two natural types: 
maturationally natural and practiced natural. Maturational natural skills include walking, 
chewing, and speaking, as well as believing in naïve physics. These types of skills are 
universal across cultures, since they require almost no specialized training. Conversely, 
practiced natural capacities include driving a car and playing the piano, as well as 
believing and applying advanced logic and math, extracting DNA and so forth.
141
 
Practiced skills differ across cultures, since they require specialized training and support.   
1. Maturational and Practiced Naturalness 
Maturational natural skills generate considerable knowledge about the 
environment and it is likely that humans possess these common-sense capacities because 
of their adaptability. But these common-sense faculties remain limited in scope since 
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their reliability operates within specific domains. This limitation carries significant 
implications for the Scope Objection. According to the second premise, evolution did not 
supply us with the natural capacity to form non-adaptive true belief. If by “natural” one 
delineates only maturational naturalness, then the second premise is true. To see this, 
consider the implications for perceptual and inferential faculties. Both sets of faculties 
function well within their respective domains but fail to generate true belief beyond the 
scope of their design. In other words, they fail to function in a reliable way in non-
adaptive domains of belief. 
i. Maturational Natural Perception 
According to McCauley, the limitation of perceptual faculties is clear by 
considering a variety of optical illusions.
 
In many cases, we cannot overcome optical 
illusions without additional tools and support. Take for example the Adelson 
checkerboard illusion. In figure 1.1 below, the picture on the left hand side displays two 
boxes A and B with slightly different shades of grey. The second figure on the right hand 
side illustrates that A and B are in fact identical shades of grey.  
44 
 
Overcoming the illusion requires attaching A and B with a grey line, since maturationally 
natural cognition requires additional support. We must utilize independent tools in order 
to overcome these common-sense biases.     
McCauley considers the Muller-Lyer Illusion. Figure 1.2 illustrates a similar 
common-sense deficiency: that we are unable to overcome the persistence of certain 
optical illusions without independent support.   
Figure 1.2 
 
The bottom line appears shorter than the top line; while measuring both lines establishes 
their equal length. McCauley notes that the Muller-Lyer Illusion provides two conflicting 
beliefs: we perceive one line longer than the other while simultaneously believing that 
this observation is false.
142
  
Optical illusions do not imply that all perceptual faculties are unreliable.  In fact, 
some optical illusions can be overcome by closing one’s eyes and changing 
environments. This fact presupposes some basic reliability.
143
Nevertheless, it is clear that 
perceptual faculties generate false beliefs when operating in environments beyond the 
scope of their design. This observation shouldn’t be surprising, since these faculties were 
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forged within a particular environment for adaptability.
144
 When these faculties operate in 
environments foreign to their design, optical illusions persist.   
Suppose we defend an evolutionary supporting strategy for perceptual cognition.  
That is, we attempt to ground the reliability of perceptual faculties within an evolutionary 
story. If by “natural” we imply maturationally natural, then the result is an effective 
debunking argument, since evolution also supplied unreliable perceptual faculties. More 
specifically, one might postulate a Scope Objection against the reliability of evolved, 
perceptual faculties given their evolutionary origin.
145
 Thus, an ESA supporting human 
perceptual faculties delineating only maturationally naturalness is found wanting.  
Consider now non-adaptive beliefs more specifically. Similar to perception, 
McCauley notes that the maturational, common-sense capacity for logical inference 
suffers a similar deficiency.   
ii. Maturational Natural Logic  
The Scope Objection to DE becomes clear when assessing logical and inferential 
abilities. In support of this claim, consider the Wason Selection Task Experiment.
146
  
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby illustrate the inability for accurately inferring 
conditionals presented in abstract ways. Consider the following: 
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A B 2 3 
 
 “If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the opposite side.  
Assuming that each of these cards has a letter on one side and a number on the opposite 
side, indicate only those cards(s) that you definitely need to turn over in order to ascertain 
that this conditional is true.”147 The correct answer is A and 3. Now consider a second 
example:  
 
 
 
 
“If a person is drinking beer, then he or she must be over 20 years old. Assuming that 
each of these cards has information about what a person is drinking on one side and about 
his or her age on the other, indicate only those card(s) that you definitely need to turn 
over in order to ascertain if any of these people are breaking this law.”148 Both tests share 
the same logical form. And yet participants are more successful with the second test.  
They answer correctly by flipping the cards “drinking beer” and “16 years old.”  
Wason’s test reveals the limitations of maturational, common-sense faculties such 
that they operate correctly only within their proper domain. Participants score higher on 
the second test because the description is in sociological terms, conducive to human 
common-sense outputs. This observation fits well with understanding the nature and 
limitations of evolved minds, since evolution supplied cognitive adaptability and not 
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abstract reflection.
149
 Moreover, the test exposes the limits of common-sense inferences 
applied in non-adaptive ways. When the test describes abstract scenarios, applicants 
commit logical fallacies like affirming the consequent. Thus, the scope of maturationally 
natural skills remains limited, and therefore we have a Scope Objection against the 
reliability of logical inference.   
If by “natural” we imply only maturational capacities, then the non-adaptive 
practice of DE remains implausible. But we needn’t limit the definition of “natural” in 
this way. According to McCauley, humans possess practiced natural cognition capable of 
overcoming maturational biases. 
iii. Practiced Natural Logic 
If the term natural cognition includes practiced naturalness, then maturational 
limitations can be overcome. Consider again Wason’s experiment. In order to 
successfully answer both tests, participants must apply the inference modus ponens (i.e. if 
p then q, p, therefore, q) and modus tollens (i.e. if p then q, not ~q, therefore, not ~p), as 
well as to avoid committing the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent (i.e. if p then 
q, q, therefore, p). By practicing these rules of deductive inference, humans are able to 
overcome maturational natural biases about logic and form true beliefs in abstract 
domains. Therefore, even if human natural cognition suffers from evolved constraints and 
is unreliable in certain domains, this does not preclude the ability to overcome and 
generate true non-adaptive beliefs. 
The main point is that there are obvious cases in which practiced natural 
applications of deductive inference are reliable. This does not imply that a full-blown 
epistemology of practiced natural knowledge succeeds. Indeed, human faculties continue 
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to generate false beliefs even after the application of reliable deductive inference occurs.  
Nevertheless, rejecting the Scope Objection only requires a sound picture of practiced 
natural reliability and not a robust theory of practiced natural epistemology.
150
      
Summary 
  It is clear that maturationally national cognition and its common-sense outputs 
remain limited in scope. Although these cognitive faculties generate true belief within 
their respective domains, they are unreliable beyond the scope of their design. If by 
“natural cognition” the second premise delineates only maturational naturalness, then the 
Scope Objection succeeds. However, my first contention clarifies the term “natural 
cognition” to include practiced naturalness. If humans possess practiced natural skills, 
then maturational biases can be overcome. 
The first contention provides minimal support for DE, since an evolutionary 
account of practiced naturalness remains essential. I proceed then to examine the strength 
of my second contention that grounds practiced natural cognition and skills within human 
evolution.   
II. The Evolution of Practiced Natural Cognition 
In this section I argue that evolution supplied practiced natural cognition and 
skills. By way of example, I assess two criteria listed by McCauley as necessary 
conditions for the rise of science and then figure how recent theories of cognitive 
evolution satisfy these conditions. This does not suggest that these conditions are 
sufficient. Perhaps future scientific discovery will yield new evidence for strengthening 
(or weakening) the proposal. However, if current theories from cognitive evolution are 
accurate, then we shouldn’t be surprised that evolution forged cognitive capacities for 
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non-adaptive beliefs. If this is right, then it seems plausible that evolution supplied 
faculties responsible for non-adaptive beliefs more generally, including systematic 
theories of epistemology. 
A. Preliminaries 
Some preliminaries are required. First, there is divergence over whether theories 
of cognitive evolution succeed. Lewontin remains skeptical, while others continue to 
project “hypotheses” for describing cognitive evolution, both with respect to biological 
organisms generally and human faculties in particular. Second, critics undermine 
adaptationist theories of cognitive evolution as nothing more than “Just so” stories.151  
But this objection is irrelevant for my purpose. Recall that affirming the weaker form of 
DE does not require defending epistemic justification. Perhaps it is nothing short of a 
lucky fluke that evolutionary processes generated reliable faculties for non-adaptive 
beliefs. Indeed, perhaps the truth of this claim is forever inscrutable. Either way, it is not 
logically impossible for evolutionary processes to succeed in producing faculties as such, 
in conjunction with the fact that skeptics lack any obvious undercutting defeater for my 
objection to premise two.   
B. Two Criteria for the Rise of Science 
McCauley credits the first criterion for the rise of science to Aristotle’s claim that 
“All men by nature desire to know.”152 Aristotle argues the search for knowledge is the 
fulfillment of human nature. Humans not only possess faculties for practical reasoning, 
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but, according to Aristotle, possess a rational mind for theoretical reflection.
153
 In order 
for human beings to flourish, they must apply intellectual virtue, by learning to “plan and 
deliberate, to ponder alternatives and strategize, and generally to chart courses of 
action.”154 Similarly, scientific reflection requires that its practitioners apply cognitive 
abilities above adaptive means. More precisely, science requires abstract thought beyond 
the scope of common-sense faculties.   
The second criterion necessary for the rise of science is external media, including 
tools, writing, and symbolic notation. External media is necessary for recording counter-
intuitive data and providing criticism of non-adaptive beliefs. Moreover, external media 
allows scientific theories to be publicly accessible. Public awareness and accessibility 
provides a means for peer review and accountability, safeguarding against poorly devised 
theories.
155
 Hence, in order for science to emerge and succeed, humans rely on the 
embeddedness of human cognitive outputs.
156
  
The two necessary conditions required for the rise of science are faculties for 
theoretical reflection and faculties responsible for external media. I argue that these two 
conditions are rooted within human cognitive evolution. For brevity, I’ll define the 
former as theoretical faculties and the latter as outsourcing faculties.
157
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1. The Evolution of Practiced Naturalness       
Recent theories that support the evolution of practiced naturalness include a 
family of hypotheses, such as: environmental complexity, external media, niche 
construction, social living, and theory of mind. I briefly consider each hypothesis and 
then figure how each contribute to my second contention. I’ll then summarize and assess 
Sober’s evolution of rationality thesis to show that the evolution of practiced naturalness 
is not logically impossible. Although logical possibility establishes very little, it becomes 
more relevant when operating in conjunction with a no-defeater clause, whereby we 
possess no good reason for denying such possibility. 
i. Environmental Complexity Thesis 
In order to postulate the evolution of practiced natural cognition, it is necessary to 
state the conditions required for the evolution of theoretical faculties. One necessary 
condition for the rise of science includes possessing cognitive faculties capable of 
overcoming common-sense bias. Maturationally natural capacities deliver true belief 
within their limited scope but are in conflict with the scientific capacity to form non-
adaptive beliefs. The environmental complexity thesis states that some organisms possess 
cognitive flexibility for dealing with environment change. That is, organisms possess 
faculties with greater plasticity for responding to environmental pressure. If this is right, 
then it is possible to imagine environmental complexity as a foundation for future 
developments of human cognition operating in non-adaptive ways.
158
          
Peter Godfrey-Smith argues that organisms display first and second order 
behaviour. First order behaviour is an organism’s response to their environment in a fixed 
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way, while second order behaviour profiles the ability to learn from experience.
159
  
Individuals within a population that exhibit the ability to adjust to the complexity of their 
environment may have garnered advantage over those lacking the ability. Environmental 
complexity includes behaviour within a species, seasonal changes, disease and predation 
that force individuals to respond in specific ways. The implication is that over time 
evolution may have selected organisms with an assorted cognitive tool kit with a 
diversity of behavioural responses.
160
 Analyzing human cognitive evolution requires 
exploring this type of cognitive tool kit, one that is not fixed or closed in shaping 
cognition but rather open and flexible for allowing greater plasticity.
161
  
We might extend the idea of cognitive plasticity with Ernst Mayr’s closed and 
open behaviour program.
162
 According to Mayr, a closed program is one innately 
acquired and cannot be altered by experience. Organisms possess a nervous system that 
instills a variety of behaviours determined by its genetic makeup. The closed genetic 
program states that nothing can be inserted into the organism’s behavioural outputs. This 
implies that animals will react to their environment in a rigid way, since the genotype 
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responsible for shaping the nervous system determines the type of behavioural program 
they will possess.
163
 In other words, a closed program determines behaviour that includes 
cognitive capabilities lacking any plasticity.  
Mayr defines the open behaviour program to include input to the organism from 
the external world. This means that new information inserts into the behavioural program 
of the nervous system. A certain species of goose exhibit an open program when goslings 
consider the first moving object they hear as the biological parent.
164
 This experience 
affects the gosling’s nervous system, leading to altered types of behaviour that include 
abandoning the biological parent. In this case, the gosling’s behaviour follows external 
indicators rather than innate instinct.
165
 This process of imprinting new information into 
the behavioural program of the organism incurs advantage over the closed, genetic 
program that remains fixed.
166
    
Applying Mayr’s thesis to the evolution of the human mind, Popper argued that 
an open program includes the possibility for personal reflection, especially about one’s 
environment. As such, Popper speculates into the rudimentary evolution of decision 
making; he states:  
Ecological conditions like those that favor the evolution of open behavioral 
programs sometimes also favor the evolution of the beginnings of consciousness, 
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by favoring conscious choices. Or in other words, consciousness originates with 
the choices that are left open by open behavioral programs.
167
 
 
Although Popper argues that decision making (and consciousness more specifically) 
reflects an emergent property, the rudimentary building blocks are indeed evolutionary. 
Here Popper cites Richard Dawkins, who argues that natural selection would have 
favoured organisms that simulate hypothetical scenarios. By postulating counter-factual 
intuitions, organisms create mechanisms for avoiding danger.
168
 Evolution may still have 
determined a probabilistic outcome, but the open program allows the input of information 
independent from the organism’s innate restrictions.169   
One final consideration is Kim Sterelny’s thesis of decoupled representation.  
Following the work of Godfrey-Smith, Sterelny focuses on organisms’ ascending grades 
of belief. Initial grades include beliefs necessary for survival – beliefs responsible for 
navigation, for example – and trigger reflexive behaviour without any deliberation.170  
The final grade of belief Sterelny calls “decoupled representations”: that is, “…internal 
states that track aspects of the world, but which do not have the function of controlling 
particular behaviors.”171 These functions are not fixed but allow for reflective awareness 
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of one’s environment, particularly one’s social environment. He goes on to argue that 
applying decoupled representations as a way of forming complex behavior only appears 
late in the evolutionary process, specifically with primates. And although it is not explicit 
that decoupled representations form actual beliefs, it is reasonable to infer that they are 
“belief like”.172  
The environmental complexity thesis supports the development of non-adaptive 
beliefs. These types of beliefs originate from cognitive flexibility and may have 
contributed to human cognitive evolution. If human ancestors possessed the cognitive 
capacity for reflecting about the environment, then this may account in part for the 
evolution of theoretical faculties. Of course these hypotheses remain speculative and do 
not assume that such behaviour programs would instill reliable faculties. Nevertheless, 
the evolution of practiced natural skills would require some rudimentary capabilities 
beyond closed programs. As Godfrey-Smith argues, perhaps these “open” evolutionary 
trajectories provide a foundation for understanding cognitive evolution.      
As already noted, however, possessing theoretical faculties remain insufficient for 
the rise of science. As indicated by McCauley, science requires the embeddedness of 
cognitive outputs, contingent on tools and technology. Without the outsourcing of 
theoretical reflections to the objective world, science would be impossible.   
ii. External Media Thesis 
According to McCauley, science requires extending non-adaptive theories to the 
objective world by external media in order for those theories to receive criticism. Within 
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the past thirty-thousand years Homo sapiens have dominated more than any 
representative in their genus, largely because of mastering tools and technology.
173
  
Archeologists have discovered tools and forms of communicative art dating back to the 
late Pleistocene era, suggesting that humans orchestrated forms of communication 
through external media.
174
  
A good example illustrating the human ability to outsource maturational 
knowledge is temperature.
175
 According to Helen De Cruz et al., human bodies generate 
reliable thermoreception necessary for regulating body temperature. But experience of 
temperature does not always provide an accurate reading because the sensitivity of 
human receptors varies across the body. For example, the human scalp is sensitive to cold 
in order to protect the brain from excessive cooling; but the scalp is not a reliable source 
of detecting temperature.
176
 This type of thermoreception is sufficient for survival but 
remains unreliable when operating beyond its domain. Overcoming thermoreceptive bias 
requires outsourcing maturational experience of temperature to independent external 
media like thermometers. Thermometers placed in a fixed position detect temperature 
independent of maturational bias. The point is clear: humans output their maturational 
knowledge to the external world by way of tools and technology, thereby allowing 
greater control of the environment.     
Tools and technology allow humans to control their environment. Control of the 
environment ensures theoretical activities divorced from adaptive struggles: activities like 
                                                          
173
 Tremlin, Minds and Gods, 21-3. 
 
174
 De Cruz et al., “Evolutionary Approaches,” 532. 
 
175
 De Cruz et al., “Evolutionary Approaches,” 532. 
 
176
 De Cruz et al., “Evolutionary Approaches,” 532. 
 
 
 
57 
 
philosophy, art, and scientific theorizing.
177
 This type of cognitive niche, along with 
applying methods of external media, may have provided the right conditions for 
theoretical and outsourcing faculties to flourish and, thus, responsible for realizing the 
growth of scientific inquiry. 
There are good reasons for grounding theoretical and outsourcing faculties within 
an evolutionary story. This does not imply that all such faculties would have generated 
true beliefs. Indeed, in many cases practiced natural faculties would have generated false 
beliefs. As already noted, however, this observation needn’t interfere with the fact that 
some practiced natural capacities function reliably in tracking truth, even if such 
mechanisms operate in a more rudimentary sense.
178
    
With these details in place, Steven Pinker’s recent thesis about the evolution of 
cognitive faculties in non-adaptive domains is relevant because he considers both 
conditions respectively. The general idea is that Homo sapiens evolved within a cognitive 
niche: an environment shaped by hominid cognitive abilities.   
iii. Pinker’s Niche Construction and Metaphorical Abstraction Thesis 
Pinker outlines his ESA for non-adaptive belief by assessing two hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis is niche construction. It is not uncommon for species to improve their 
environment for increasing survival and changing their evolutionary trajectory.
179
 Pinker 
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argues that the same type of environmental change occurred with Hominids. He inquires 
into Wallace’s skepticism about the explanatory force of natural selection, stating:   
…Nonetheless it is appropriate to engage the profound puzzle [Wallace] raised; 
namely, why do humans have the ability to pursue abstract intellectual feats such 
as science, mathematics, philosophy, and law, given that opportunities to exercise 
these talents did not exist in the foraging lifestyle in which humans evolved and 
would not have parlayed themselves into advantages in survival and reproduction 
even if they did?
180
   
 
In response to Wallace, Pinker argues that humans evolved within a cognitive niche. A 
cognitive niche is a mode of survival characterized by humans’ control of their 
environment through reasoning and social interaction.
181
 Niche construction alters a 
species’ environment and therefore affects the selective pressure attributed to that 
species.
182
  
Pinker’s niche construction thesis is important because it suggests that human 
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cognitive evolution included the freedom to practice theoretical reflection and apply 
external media. Presumably, organisms that applied practiced naturalness would only 
pass down their genes to future generations provided it was not adverse to selection.
183
   
    The second arm of Pinker’s thesis includes the ability to perform “metaphorical 
abstraction.” Cognitive faculties necessary for projecting concrete beliefs also have the 
capacity to form metaphorical abstractions. In support of this claim, Pinker considers 
psycholinguistic scenarios. The sentences “Rose forced the door open” and “Rose forced 
Sadie to go” differ in their usage of the verb “force.” The first sentence reflects a concrete 
idea, while the second illustrates a metaphorical abstraction. Pinker suggests that 
grammatical faculties utilize concrete descriptions of “force” to then postulate 
metaphorical abstractions of the same concept. As such, faculties typically reserved for 
adaptive purpose – that is, faculties necessary for concrete descriptions – may create 
abstract concepts analogous to non-adaptive beliefs. If this is right, and given the right 
cognitive niche, then evolution may have supplied faculties with the capacity in forming 
non-adaptive beliefs.  
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 We possess a wide range of theses for defending my second contention. Although 
controversial, theories of cognitive evolution provide some support for understanding the 
evolution of the faculties responsible for the rise of science. In other words, we possess 
accounts depicting the evolution of theoretical and outsourcing faculties and, thus, the 
evolution of practiced naturalness.  
Now suppose these accounts amount to “Just so” stories, as Lewontin argues. Even 
if we reject these hypotheses as scientifically untenable, it is not logically impossible for 
evolutionary processes to have generated faculties operating in non-adaptive domains.  
Not only does the evolution of practiced naturalness seem logically coherent, but, unless 
we have some undercutting defeater, we should accept its plausibility. I want to conclude 
this section by considering Elliot Sober’s evolution of rationality thesis and then bring the 
Scope Objection into focus. 
iv. Sober’s Evolution of Rationality Thesis 
Sober argues that natural selection is sufficient for supporting the non-adaptive 
belief responsible for the scientific method.
184
 Sober defends this claim by responding to 
the charge that “an evolutionary account of the origins of rationality is impossible 
because natural selection is too coarse-grained a process to single out the scientific 
method from innumerable other, less rational, procedures for constructing beliefs out of 
other beliefs.”185 This view requires two assumptions: (i) the rationality responsible for 
the scientific method does not incur reproductive benefit to its practitioners; and (ii) even 
if (i) is false, the rationality responsible for the scientific method holds equal value with 
                                                          
184
 Elliot Sober, “The Evolution of Rationality,” Synthese 46: 95-120. 
 
185
 Sober, “The Evolution,” 98. 
 
 
 
61 
 
irrational faculties, such that either faculty would have been selected. Thus, according to 
the truth of (i) and (ii), it is unlikely that evolution forged cognition responsible for non-
adaptive belief including the scientific method.         
Sober thinks that (i) requires two distinct types of cognition: practical cognition 
responsible for survival and non-adaptive cognition responsible for the scientific 
method.
186
 If this assumption is right, then evolution did not select the rationality 
responsible for the scientific method. Sober rejects the assumption, and argues that even 
if (i) is true, it doesn’t follow that cognition responsible for science does not emerge over 
evolutionary history.   
In response to assumption (ii), Sober considers different inductive scenarios 
where each scenario holds equal potential for being selected. Consider the predicates “is 
green’ and “is grue,” where “grue” refers to “all emeralds are green before a time t and 
blue after t…” famously described by Nelson Goodman.187 Goodman supports the truth 
of both predicates given our observation. But according to Sober, the former satisfies the 
principle of parsimony, and, thus, cognition yielding to simplicity would have been 
selected for.
188
 Commenting on Sober’s estimation of Goodman, Ruse states:  
The Proto-human who sat around worrying about grue may have been the better 
philosopher but it is doubtful that he or she was fitter in the Darwinian sense than the 
simple minded proto who was satisfied with thinking green.
189
       
 
Cognition that delivers basic induction would be selected for depending on both its 
success and its simplicity. And because of this basic process, it would not be unusual for 
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an enhanced faculty of induction responsible for science to emerge over the course of 
evolutionary history.
190
  
The same argument for the evolution of induction applies to non-adaptive 
beliefs.
191
 Non-adaptive beliefs are the product of cognitive capacities selected because of 
their success and their simplicity well before those non-adaptive beliefs are realized. 
According to Sober, then, practical cognition operating over time generates the non-
adaptive rationality responsible for the scientific method.
192
 If Sober is right, then the 
evolution of practiced naturalness is not logically impossible. Moreover, unless we 
possess some defeater for thinking otherwise, we should accept its plausibility.  
Therefore, we can support the second contention by appealing to both recent scientific 
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theorizing as well as affirming its logical consistency in conjunction with a no-defeater 
clause. 
C. The Scope Objection Revisited 
With these details in place, consider again the Scope Objection to DE.   
1. DE is plausible only if evolution supplied us with the natural cognitive capacities 
for achieving non-adaptive true beliefs. 
2. Evolution did not supply us with the natural cognitive capacities for achieving 
non-adaptive true beliefs. 
3. So, DE is implausible. 
Why should we think that premise two is true? We possess a number of evolutionary 
explanations necessary for supplying the natural cognition for achieving non-adaptive 
true beliefs. In the very least premise true remains controversial. Indeed, suppose we 
grant Lewontin’s skepticism that theories of cognitive evolution are beyond the scope of 
science, there are still viable philosophical reasons for rejecting premise two. It is not 
logically impossible and we possess no immediate defeater undermining the evolution of 
practiced naturalness. Thus, we have good reasons for rejecting the Scope Objection to 
DE.   
Summary: 
The evolution of practiced naturalness is not scientifically inexplicable and not 
logically impossible. Moreover, at present we possess no defeater for thinking otherwise.
 
Conversely, all things considered, such an evolutionary story seems perfectly suitable for 
scientific conjecture and falsification. If this is right, then evolution may have provided 
the cognitive capacities for actualizing Aristotle’s claim, since human cognition is the 
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product of a flexible and open behaviour program. Furthermore, the cognitive niche with 
which primates have evolved and the human dependency on advanced tools and 
technology provides a foundation for outsourcing theoretical beliefs. Our hominid 
ancestors were not bound by maturational limitations and perhaps overtime this provided 
the cognitive bedrock for overcoming common-sense biases and outsources non-adaptive 
beliefs.  
III. Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined two types of natural cognition, whereby one type is 
capable of overcoming the common-sense limitations of the other. I argued that we 
possess a wide range of scientific hypotheses supporting the evolution of practiced 
naturalness that may account for the rise of science and that such accounts are not 
logically incoherent. Moreover, it is difficult to find any substantial defeater claim 
undermining such evolutionary supporting strategies. Thus, the second premise of the 
Scope Objection is false and DE remains plausible. 
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Chapter 4 
Objections, Responses and Conclusions 
In this chapter I evaluate two objections to my solution to the Scope Objection.  
First, I revisit Plantinga’s EAAN, focusing on the distinction between cognitive 
indicators and true belief. If Plantinga is right, then some theories of cognitive evolution 
amount to cognitive indication but not true belief. Second, I consider Lewontin’s 
skepticism towards the theories of cognitive evolution. I argue that even if Lewontin is 
right, this does not undermine DE in the restricted sense. That is to say, if DE only seeks 
to substantiate cognitive reliability for producing truth, then Lewontin’s skepticism is 
irrelevant to its plausibility.      
I. Evolution, Cognitive Indication, and True Belief 
I have been arguing that evolutionary processes would have been sufficient for 
explaining the reliability of human cognitive faculties. The most popular objection to this 
view is Plantinga’s recent version of EAAN.193 On the assumption that naturalism is true, 
Plantinga argues that evolutionary processes cannot account for the production of true 
belief. This is because the adaptability of human cognitive faculties is not contingent on 
forming true belief.   
Critics undermine Plantinga’s argument by describing cases where organisms 
display belief formation incurring adaptive behaviour. But Plantinga rejects this move 
because such accounts do not reflect propositional belief but cognitive indication; 
Plantinga states: 
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Objection: consider a frog on a lily pad.  A fly buzzes by; the frog’s tongue flicks 
out and captures the fly. If this frog is to behave successfully, adaptively, there 
must be mechanisms in it that register the distance to the fly at each moment, its 
size, speed, direction, and so on. Aren’t these mechanisms part of the frog’s 
cognitive faculties?  And don’t they have to be accurate in order for the frog to 
behave adaptively?  And isn’t it therefore the case that the frog’s cognitive 
mechanisms must be accurate, reliable, if the frog is to survive and 
reproduce?...Reply: that frog clearly does have “indicators”, neural structures that 
receive input from the frog’s sense organs, are correlated with the path of the 
insect as it flies past, and are connected with the frog’s muscles in such a way that 
flicks out its tongue and captures that unfortunate fly…Now if we like, we can 
include these indicators under the rubric “cognitive faculties.” The important 
point to see here, however, is that indication of this sort does not require belief. In 
particular, it does not require belief having to do with the state of affairs 
indicated; indeed it is entirely compatible with belief inconsistent with that state 
of affairs.
194
   
 
Plantinga understands cognitive indicators to include processes allowing organisms to 
flee from predators, locate food, and find mates for reproduction. Indicators must 
function properly in mapping the environment for producing adaptive behaviour.  
Theories of cognitive evolution depict organisms that respond to their 
environment in a similar way to Plantinga’s frog and then relate this belief-forming 
process with the evolution of Homo sapiens. But if Plantinga is right, then this approach 
remains unsupported because it confuses two types of cognitive outputs: indication and 
belief content. In the least, proponents of DE must demonstrate a link between those 
processes responsible for cognitive indication with the formation of true beliefs.   
Consider Griffiths’ and Wilkins’ argument in light of Plantinga’s objection. GW 
argue that evolution would have selected cognitive faculties responsible for common-
sense beliefs that track true states of affairs:  
Any plausible account of the evolution of these sorts of [common-sense] beliefs in 
humans and other animals will be of the kind described in this section. At the 
heart of that explanation will be the fact that animals can increase their fitness by 
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detecting states of affairs in the world and matching their actions to those states of 
affairs.
195
 
 
If GW’s argument assumes a type of cognitive indication, then their account fails to 
incorporate belief content. And by extension, their attempt to link common sense with 
non-adaptive belief becomes problematic. The implication is that the evolutionary 
process described by GW is not one illustrating a belief-forming mechanism but mere 
cognitive indication.
196
   
 Although GW’s argument may succumb to Plantinga’s objection, the theories of 
cognitive evolution outlined in chapter 3 avoid this conundrum. That is because they do 
not rely on a general conception of cognitive indication but rather postulate the evolution 
of reflective mechanisms with the potential for realizing non-adaptive beliefs. For 
example, Pinker’s thesis includes the concept of cognitive indication, but also establishes 
a distinct thesis for analyzing non-adaptive belief: niche construction and metaphorical 
abstraction. Similarly, Sterelny’s grades of “belief” include cognitive indication at the 
rudimentary level, but it is precisely the nature of decoupled representation that reveals 
something beyond mere indication. Finally, Popper’s emergence of mind provides a 
complete break from cognitive indication. If Popper is right, then evolution may have 
supplied the emergence of a distinct set of faculties responsible for more reflective 
practice. Indeed, says Popper, these distinct faculties generate reflective awareness of 
counter-factual intuition. This account remains distinct from Plantinga’s conception of 
cognitive indication.    
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 Myron A. Penner raises an important distinction here between reflective and non-reflective 
outputs.  Perhaps the necessary link situates within a type of dual process theory, whereby “cognitive 
indicators” are analogous to our non-reflective mechanisms. These mechanisms function as the bedrock for 
our non-reflective beliefs and their propositional content. If Penner is right, then this would salvage 
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 Although Plantinga’s distinction between cognitive indication and belief content 
affects many types of supporting strategies – especially those theses focusing on common 
sense – the theories outlined in the previous chapter seem immune to this charge.   
II. Lewontin’s Skepticism  
Lewontin has long been skeptical about the theories of cognitive evolution and 
considers the project untenable. If Lewontin is right, then we must remain agnostic about 
whether evolution supplied the cognitive capacities for achieving non-adaptive belief.   
A. The Problem with Evolutionary Theories of Cognition 
Lewontin’s skepticism situates within a larger debate between evolutionary 
psychology and the non-adaptationist views of the late S.J Gould. Lewontin and Gould’s 
article “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm” rejects a strict 
adaptationist paradigm concerning evolutionary theory.
197
 They argue that many evolved 
traits are spandrels (by-products) existing as necessities of other adaptive features. It is in 
this context that Lewontin takes aim at evolutionary psychology and theories of cognitive 
evolution, suggesting that such accounts fail to satisfy the demands of “real” science.198   
Lewontin claims that we are missing essential clues within the fossil record for 
hypothesizing about cognitive evolution. Furthermore, even if scientists possessed the 
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necessary fossils for reconstructing the relevant traits for inferring about the evolution of 
human faculties, the fossils remain difficult (perhaps impossible) to interpret in the right 
way. Thus, Lewontin considers the task of reconstructing cognitive evolution near 
impossible, and avoids “hypothesizing” in this way since these claims are beyond 
verification.
199
 Even if these theories reflect reality, Lewontin argues that at best they 
remain “Just so” stories beyond evidential support. 
If Lewontin is right, then knowledge about whether evolution supplied the 
cognitive capacities for achieving non-adaptive beliefs remains inscrutable. That is, we 
can neither affirm nor deny the second premise of the Scope Objection. What follows 
from this skepticism, if anything? Provided that we have overcome Plantinga’s objection, 
DE remains immune to this charge. As Lewontin admits, it is trivial that evolution had 
some bearing on human cognition, only that we lack knowledge about the process.
200
 But 
if we have good reasons for thinking that humans evolved by evolutionary processes, 
then presumably human faculties were included in the process. Indeed, perhaps non-
adaptive beliefs are epistemic flukes, piggybacking off some other adaptive faculties. A 
non-adaptive process of this sort would still generate reliable faculties. Exactly what type 
of argument – save Plantinga’s – supports the second premise or even undermines 
objections to it? Nagel just concedes the possibility of evolved practiced naturalness and 
then proceeds to consider another objection. In other words, it seems prima facie that we 
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should reject premise two until some undercutting defeater presents itself. Skepticism 
towards premise two does not imply that the premise is true.     
Summary: 
Plantinga distinguishes between cognitive indication and belief content. 
Assuming that Plantinga is right about this distinction, proponents of DE must postulate 
the evolution of cognitive devices responsible for belief-formation in a more reflective 
sense and not indicator outputs akin to common sense. 
Lewontin remains skeptical about theories of cognitive evolution, considering 
these hypotheses to be “Just so” stories beyond evidential scope. Thus, if Lewontin is 
right, knowledge of premise two of the Scope Objection remains inscrutable. This 
problem can be resolved provided we restrict DE to include only cognitive reliability for 
producing true belief and not justification.  
III. Conclusions and Problems for Further Thought 
 DE is controversial, creating divergence between proponents of ESAs and EDAs. 
Some biologists and philosophers argue that evolutionary processes would have included 
the formation of reliable faculties, while others contend that evolution precludes 
reliability. Moreover, it is unclear how DE and epistemic justification coincide. For the 
present purpose, the only priority has been to focus on the implications of evolution for 
cognitive reliability and not justification. By restricting DE as such, I’m confident that it 
overcomes the Scope Objection. 
 Overcoming the Scope Objection first requires nuancing the term “natural” to 
distinguish between two types of natural cognition. Humans possess maturational natural 
capacities responsible for common-sense beliefs. These capacities operate well within 
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their respective domain, but generate false beliefs beyond the scope of their design. We 
also possess practiced natural capacities. These capacities enable us to generate non-
adaptive beliefs, provided we apply the right tools and training. 
 The second requirement for overcoming the Scope Objection must ground 
practiced naturalness within evolutionary theory. One must demonstrate how 
evolutionary processes supplied practiced natural cognition and skills. Here we possess a 
wide range of scientific and philosophical theses that demonstrate the evolution of 
practiced naturalness responsible for the rise of science. From this premise it seems 
plausible that evolution supplied cognitive capacities for non-adaptive beliefs more 
generally, including systematic theories of epistemology.   
 The obvious problem with the current project is that a restriction on DE such that 
one precludes justification undermines the main focus of epistemology. The history of 
inquiring into knowledge and rational belief centers on epistemic justification. If DE 
includes the concept of justification, then overcoming the Scope Objection may be more 
difficult. In any event, proponents of DE must begin postulating ways to overcome Scope 
Objections pertaining to evolutionary justification and not just speculating into 
evolutionary accounts supporting cognitive reliability.  
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